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FRANZE

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
AND ORIGINALISM:
LESSONS FROM KING V. BRASIER
Anthony J. Franze

*

“Marry, Sir, they have committed false report”
—WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING, act 5, sc. 1.

INTRODUCTION
When a national children’s rights organization asked me to
draft an amicus brief in Davis v. Washington1 to alert the
Supreme Court to the impact its decision interpreting the
Confrontation Clause may have on child abuse prosecutions, I
had no idea it was going to thrust me back in time to the laws
and practices of seventeenth and eighteenth century England. It
was not long, however, before I made the acquaintance of Sir
*

Attorney, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, D.C.; Adjunct Professor
of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. The author thanks
Brooklyn Law School for inviting him to participate in this symposium. He
also thanks symposium participant Professor Thomas Davies, for providing
guidance on historical sources and invaluable comments on this article.
Thanks also to Professor Sheila B. Scheuerman and Professor Daniel
Barnhizer for comments on earlier drafts. Additional thanks to Kathleen
Prince from MSU’s library and Ann Greenwood from Arnold & Porter
LLP’s London office library for research assistance. All errors, of course,
are solely those of the author. The views expressed herein are solely those of
the author and not those of Arnold & Porter LLP or any of the firm’s clients.
1
126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). The Davis decision addressed two cases
argued in tandem, Washington v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) (en
banc) and Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). This article
refers to the cases collectively as “Davis.”
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Walter Raleigh, the Privy Council, and the Marian statutes.
History, I was reminded, has become central to confrontation
doctrine since the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford v.
Washington.2 And not just any history. Justice Scalia, writing
for the Crawford majority, made clear that what matters is the
“original meaning” of the Confrontation Clause—an
interpretation “faithful to the Framers’ understanding.”3
In Crawford, the defendant was tried for attempted murder,
and the Court addressed whether the admission of a recorded
statement by the defendant’s wife, who did not testify at trial
because of a state law marital privilege, violated the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment confrontation right.4 Finding the existing
confrontation framework “unpredictable,” “amorphous,” and
inconsistent with “historical principles,”5 the Crawford Court
crafted a new confrontation test that distinguishes between
“testimonial” and “nontestimonial” hearsay:
Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly
consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the
States flexibility in their development of hearsay
2

541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 59-60.
4
Id. at 38, 40, 68.
5
Id. at 60-63. In Crawford, the Court overruled Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56 (1980), which “condition[ed] the admissibility of all hearsay
evidence on whether it falls under a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or
bears ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’” Id. at 60 (quoting
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). The Court determined that the Roberts framework
conflated the constitutional requirements with the law of hearsay, strayed
from historic principles, and was inherently flawed:
[The Roberts reliability] framework is so unpredictable that it
fails to provide meaningful protection from even core
confrontation violations. Reliability is an amorphous, if not
entirely subjective, concept . . . . The unpardonable vice of the
Roberts test, however, is not its unpredictability, but its
demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that
the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.
Id. at 63; accord Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1179 (2007)
(discussing Crawford overruling Roberts in the context of finding that the
Crawford rule could not be applied retroactively).
3
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law . . . . Where testimonial evidence is at issue,
however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the
common law required: unavailablity and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.6
Two years later, Davis presented the Court’s first
opportunity to define the parameters of “testimonial,” something
Crawford expressly left “for another day.”7 At issue in Davis
was whether a recording of a 911 call as well as an affidavit and
hearsay statements made during a police interview admitted at
trial in two domestic violence cases were “testimonial.”8
Adhering to Crawford’s originalist approach,9 the parties’ and
amici’s briefs in Davis focused on framing-era history.
Nearly all of the Davis briefs10 discussed a 1779 child rape
6

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
Id. (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of ‘testimonial.”).
8
Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2270-73 (2006) (describing
background of Washington v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) (en banc)
and Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), which were argued in
tandem and decided in one opinion).
9
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
10
See Brief of Petitioner Hershel Hammon, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (No.
05-5705), 2005 WL 3597706; Brief of Respondent, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266
(No. 05-5705), 2006 WL 271825; Reply Brief of Petitioner Hershel
Hammon, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (No. 05-5705), 2006 WL 615151; Brief
for Petitioner, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (No. 05-5224), 2005 WL 3598182;
Brief of Respondent, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (No. 05-5224), 2006 WL
271825; Reply Brief for Petitioner, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (No. 05-5224),
2006 WL 542177. For the amici briefs that discuss Brasier, see Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Davis, 126 S. Ct.
2266 (No. 05-5224), 2006 WL 303911; Brief for the States of Illinois et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (Nos.
05-5224, 05-5705), 2006 WL 303912; Brief of Amicus Curiae, the National
Association of Counsel for Children (NACC) in Support of Respondents,
Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (Nos. 05-5224, 05-5705), 2006 WL 284227. The
author was counsel of record for amicus NACC and would like to thank
Professor Thomas D. Lyon of the University of Southern California Law
School as well as Raymond LaMagna and Jacob Smiles for their contributions
to the brief, including some of the initial research on Brasier discussed in this
article.
7
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case, King v. Brasier.11 In Brasier, Mary Harris, a child under
seven years old, “immediately on her coming home,” told her
mother and a woman lodging in the home that the defendant had
sexually assaulted her.12 At the defendant’s trial for assault with
intent to commit a rape, the child “was not sworn or produced
as a witness.”13 Mary’s mother and the lodger, however,
testified that Mary told them she had been assaulted and had
identified the defendant as the perpetrator. The jury convicted
the defendant,14 but the trial judge referred the case to the
Twelve Judges for review, a practice analogous to a modern day
appeal.15 The Twelve Judges unanimously reversed the
conviction, holding that “no testimony whatever can be legally
received except upon oath” and “therefore, that the evidence of
the information which the infant had given to her mother and the
other witness, ought not to have been received.”16
The defendants in Davis naturally argued that Brasier
proved, at common law, hearsay statements made “immediately”
after an assault were characterized as “testimony” forbidden
from evidence.17 Thus, they reasoned, Brasier showed that the
911 call and statements to the police—even if considered excited
utterances—would be “testimonial” and barred from evidence in
1779, over a decade before ratification of the Confrontation
Clause in 1791.18
11

168 Eng. Rep. 202, 1 Leach 199 (K.B. 1779).
Id. at 202, 1 Leach at 200.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
As Professor Langbein has explained, “[w]hen a point of difficultly
arose that a trial judge was reluctant to decide on his own . . . the judge
could defer sentencing and refer the question to a meeting held back in
London of all the judges, commonly twelve, of the three common law
courts.” JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL
212-13 (2003).
16
Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. at 202-03, 1 Leach at 200.
17
See infra text accompanying notes 31-35.
18
Id. Although the Supreme Court often treats “original meaning” as an
inquiry into the generally accepted meaning that a provision in the Bill of
Rights had at the time of ratification in 1791, some argue that 1789, the date
the Sixth Amendment was framed, is the appropriate cut-off date. See infra
12
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Writing for the Davis majority, Justice Scalia found no need
to address any spontaneous declaration exception to
confrontation and instead adopted a new standard for
“testimonial”—limited to the situations presented—that focused
on whether the “primary purpose” of the out-of-court statement
was to assist police in responding to an “ongoing emergency.”19
Justice Scalia’s opinion, however, did briefly mention Brasier,20
implicitly suggesting that the case may be instructive to
confrontation issues in other contexts, including one of the
principal questions Davis left unresolved: whether statements
made to private individuals rather than government officials can
ever be “testimonial.”21
notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
19
Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006). In Davis, the
Court adopted the following test, limiting it to the factual contexts presented
in the cases:
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all
conceivable statements . . . it suffices to decide the present cases
to hold as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in
the course of police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency,
and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish
or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.
Id. The Court held that the 911 recording admitted against defendant Davis
was nontestimonial under this test because, “the circumstances of [the
victim’s] interrogation objectively indicate its primary purpose was to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Id. at 2277. The Court
found the affidavit and hearsay admitted against defendant Hammon,
however, was “testimonial” since it was “entirely clear from the
circumstances that the interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly
past criminal conduct . . . . There was no emergency in progress . . . .
Objectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the
interrogation was to investigate a possible crime . . . .” Id. at 2278.
20
Id. at 2277.
21
In Davis, the Court expressly declined to address whether statements
to non-law enforcement personnel can ever be testimonial: “For the purposes
of this opinion (and without deciding the point), we consider [911 operators’]

6/22/2007 1:09 AM

FRANZE

500

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Part I of this article traces the common law before and after
Brasier and argues that the case has no place in confrontation
doctrine, under an originalist approach or otherwise.22 When
read in context, Brasier is not about confrontation at all. Rather,
the case concerns unique framing-era law governing the
competency of children to take the oath and give sworn—or
unsworn—testimony at trial.23 More fundamentally, the report of
Brasier discussed in Davis could not have influenced the
Framers’ understanding of confrontation because it was not in
print until 1815, over two decades after the framing and
ratification of the Sixth Amendment. The 1815 report was a
revised version of reports of the case in print from 1789 until
1799. The earlier versions made no mention of any hearsay and,
indeed, reported that the child testified at trial, essentially taking
the case outside the realm of confrontation.24
It is plausible, moreover, that the Framers would not have
been aware of any report of Brasier and—given the legal
authorities that were available in framing-era America—would
have understood that hearsay accounts by parents, doctors, and
acquaintances concerning statements made by child sexual abuse
victims would be admissible in criminal trials without regard to
whether the statements would now be considered “testimonial”
or “nontestimonial.”25
Part II argues that Brasier serves as an apt case study on
some of the practical limits of originalism as a basis for criminal
procedure.26 That the entire debate over Brasier is based on a
acts to be acts of the police. As in Crawford, therefore, our holding today
makes it unnecessary to consider whether and when statements made to
someone other than law enforcement personnel are ‘testimonial.’” Id. at 2274
n.2 (citation omitted).
22
See infra Part I.C-D.
23
See infra Part I.C.1.
24
See infra Part I.C.2.
25
See infra Part I.C.2.
26
Crawford prompted additional scholarship concerning the longstanding
debate over originalism. For articles critical of originalism or history in
Crawford, see generally Thomas Y. Davies, Not “the Framers’ Design”:
How the Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the CrawfordDavis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Original Confrontation
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report of the case that did not exist in 1791—and that the
original report eluded the parties, the Solicitor General’s office,
amici, and the Supreme Court in Davis as well as most
academics who have analyzed the case over the years—raises
questions about a framework that essentially requires lawyers
and judges to become amateur historians. To be sure,
originalists readily acknowledge that there may be difficulties in
determining original meaning and applying it to modern
circumstances.27 Even so, that may discount the practical reality
that criminal lawyers in the trenches—and the judges deciding
these issues—cannot reasonably be expected to have the time to
find, much less trace the origins of, each and every common law
case that seems significant to the confrontation issue before
them. That is particularly the case given that many historical
sources are not readily available without resort to specialized
Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349 (2007) [hereinafter Davies, Not the Framers’
Design]; Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did
They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK.
L. REV. 105, 105, 156-62 (2005) [hereinafter Davies, What Did the Framers
Know]; Thomas Y. Davies, Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in
Crawford’s “Cross-Examination Rule”: A Reply to Mr. Kry, 72 BROOK L.
REV. 557 (2007) [hereinafter Davies, Revisiting Fictional Originalism];
Kenneth Graham, Confrontation Stories: Raleigh on the Mayflower, 3 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 209 (2005); 30A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6371.2 (Supp. 2006);
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions of Crawford v.
Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219 (2005); Rodger W. Kirst, Does
Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine?, 71
BROOK L. REV. 35 (2005). For views supporting originalism or the history in
Crawford, see Robert Kry, Confrontation under the Marian Statutes: A
Response to Professor Davies, 72 BROOK L. REV. 493 (2007); Stepanos
Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of
Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J.
183 (2005).
27
E.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 45-46 (Princeton Univ. Press 1997) (“The difficulties
and uncertainties of determining original meaning and applying it to modern
circumstances are negligible compared with the difficulties and uncertainties
of the philosophy which says that the Constitution changes . . . . The
originalist, if he does not have all the answers, has many of them. The
Confrontation Clause, for example, requires confrontation.”).
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subscription databases or rare book collections. Given the
nature of the sources, it may even be possible for advocates with
time and resources to construct a compelling case of “original
meaning” for either side of an issue.
All of this is not to say that history is irrelevant to an
understanding of confrontation or other rights. Nor is the fact
that a legal framework is difficult to apply necessarily a sound
basis to abandon it. Still, the question remains whether the realworld limitations of anchoring a legal framework rigidly to
“original meaning” will result in shorthand legal tests, selective
advocacy, results-oriented decision-making, and the very
“unpredictable” and “amorphous” framework Crawford sought
to replace.
I. MUCH ADO ABOUT BRASIER
A. The Brasier Case
The Brasier case as set forth in the English Reports and
discussed by the litigants and Supreme Court in Davis is short
enough to set forth in full:
This was a case reserved for the opinion of the
Twelve Judges, by Mr. Justice Buller, at the Spring
Assizes for Reading, in the year 1779, on the trial of
an indictment for an assault with intent to commit a
rape on the body of Mary Harris, an infant under
seven years of age.
The case against the prisoner was proved by the
mother of the child, and by another woman who
lodged with her, to whom the child, immediately on
her coming home, told all the circumstances of the
injury which had been done to her: and there was no
fact or circumstance to confirm the information which
the child had given, except that the prisoner lodged at
the very place which she had described, and that she
had received some hurt, and that she, on seeing him
the next day, had declared that he was the man; but
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she was not sworn or produced as a witness on the
trial.
The prisoner was convicted; but the judgment was
respited, on a doubt, created by a marginal note to a
case in Dyer’s Reports (Dyer, 303, b, in marg; 1
Hale, 302, 634; 2 Hale, 279; 11 Mod. 228; 1 Atkins,
29; Foster, 70; 2 Hawk. 612; Gilb. L. E. 144); for
these notes having been made by Lord Chief-Justice
Treby, are considered of great weight and authority;
and it was submitted to the Twelve Judges, Whether
this evidence was sufficient in point of law?
The Judges assembled at Serjeants’-Inn Hall 29 April
1779, were unanimously of opinion, That no
testimony whatever can be legally received except
upon oath; and that an infant, though under the age of
seven years, may be sworn in a criminal prosecution,
provided such infant appears, on strict examination by
the Court, to possess a sufficient knowledge of the
nature and consequences of an oath (see White’s case,
post, 430, Old Bailey October Session, 1786), for
there is no precise or fixed rule as to the time within
which infants are excluded from giving evidence; but
their admissibility depends upon the sense and reason
they entertain of the danger and impiety of falsehood,
which is to be collected from their answers to
questions propounded to them by the Court; but if
they are found incompetent to take an oath, their
testimony cannot be received. The Judges determined,
therefore, that the evidence of the information which
the infant had given to her mother and the other
witness, ought not to have been received.—The
prisoner received a pardon (see the case of Rex v.
Travers, 2 Strange, 700).28
28

King v. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. 202, 202-03, 1 Leach 199, 199-200
(K.B. 1779). As discussed infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text, the
report on Brasier changed over time. The litigants and Court in Davis cited
only the version reprinted in the English Reports.
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B. How Brasier Became a Topic of Debate
Only recently did Brasier become a significant topic of
confrontation discourse. It was not cited by the Crawford
majority29 and for the two years following Crawford, little was
said in cases or commentary about Brasier.30
In Davis, however, the defendants argued that Brasier
supported reversal of their convictions, each focusing primarily
29

Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, cited Brasier in his concurring
opinion. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69-70 (2004) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist used Brasier to support his
argument that the majority’s “distinction between testimonial and
nontestimonial statements, contrary to its claim, is no better rooted in history
than our current doctrine.” Id. at 69. Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist
cited Brasier for the proposition that at common law “out-of-court statements
made by someone other than the accused and not taken under oath . . . were
generally not considered substantive evidence upon which a conviction could
be based.” Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the Framers thus would
not have considered these statements in the same league as statements given
under oath and likely would not have had the same concerns about the
admission of unsworn statements, even “testimonial” ones. See id. at 70-71
& n.4 (“[I]t is far from clear that courts in the late 18th century would have
treated unsworn statements, even testimonial ones, the same as sworn
statements.”).
30
Westlaw’s legal databases from the date Crawford was decided in
March 2004 until certiorari was granted in Davis in October 2005 reveal no
citations or discussions of Brasier. On Confrontation Blog, however,
Professor Richard D. Friedman noted,
I have been commenting on very recent cases, but here is R. v.
Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 168 E.R. 202, a case from 1779 that has
been much cited over the years. It bears on the treatment not
only of fresh accusations but also of statements made by
children and of accusations made to private care-givers. The
report is as it stands in the English Reports, later annotations
and all.
See R. v. Brasier—a classic case from 1779, http://confrontationright.
blogspot.com/2005_12_01_archive.html (Dec. 24, 2005. 04:15 EST). After
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Davis, a justice on the Montana
Supreme Court issued a dissenting opinion citing Brasier, among other
sources, in support of the view that statements can be testimonial even if
made to a non-government official or agent. See State v. Mizenko, 127 P.3d
458, 481 (Mont. 2006) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
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on the Twelve Judges’ determination that “no testimony
whatever can be legally received except upon oath”31 and
“therefore, that the evidence of the information which the infant
had given to her mother and the other witness, ought not to have
been received.”32 These statements, the defendants argued,
proved two main propositions. First, that the out-of-court
accusatory statements made by young Mary Harris over a
decade before the Confrontation Clause’s ratification were
characterized as “testimony” and should not have been admitted
in evidence at trial. Second, Mary Harris’s hearsay statements
were excluded even though they were made “immediately” after
the alleged offense, refuting any “excited utterance” or
spontaneous declaration exception to confrontation at common
law. Defendant Hammon made a more expansive argument,
suggesting that Brasier showed that statements made to nongovernment personnel can be “testimonial” and fall within the
scope of the Confrontation Clause:
The manifest premise of the judges’ discussion [in
Brasier] was that if the speaker had been an adult it
would have been plainly improper for other persons
to relay her accusations—her “testimony”—to
court . . . . Brasier clearly reflects the law of its
time, and it held squarely against admissibility
notwithstanding the presence of several factors,
absent in [this] case, that might have been argued to
point the other way—the demonstration of
immediacy, and the facts that the speaker was a child,
that her audience was not government officials, and
that she was not responding to questioning.
Thus, at the time of the Framing, there was no
special rule allowing admissibility of accusatorial
statements because they were made under the stress
of excitement.33
31

King v. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. 202, 202, 1 Leach 199, 200 (K.B.

1779).
32
33

Id. at 203, 1 Leach at 200.
Brief of Petitioner Hershel Hammon, supra note 10, at *27-28
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In response to arguments by amici, both defendants
acknowledged that eighteenth century trials in London’s Old
Bailey court reflected repeated instances where child hearsay
concerning sexual abuse was admitted into evidence.34 Each,
however, argued that Brasier “changed the rules, holding that
sufficiently mature children could testify at trial, characterizing
the out-of-court accusation made by the child there as
testimonial, and so excluding it.”35
(footnote omitted). Hammon’s reply brief reiterated that Brasier illustrated “a
non-controversial understanding that (putting aside the age of the child) the
accusation was testimonial in nature . . . .” Reply Brief of Petitioner Hershel
Hammon, supra note 10, at *8 n.9. Hammon also acknowledged, however,
that “[h]ow this history should now affect admission of statements made by
children is, of course, a question that this Court need not reach here. Other
considerations as well, not presented here, might affect how the confrontation
right is applied with respect to child witnesses.” Id. at *8 n.10 (citing
Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation
Clause, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1258, 1280-85 (2003)). Hammon’s counsel,
Professor Friedman, as well as other academics, have recognized that
different considerations may apply when the statements are by children. See
Richard D. Friedman, Grappling With the Meaning of “Testimonial,” 71
BROOK. L. REV. 241, 272-73 (2005); Richard D. Friedman, The Conundrum
of Children, Confrontation, and Hearsay, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243,
249-52 (2002); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of Law Professors Sherman J.
Clark, James J. Duane, Richard D. Friedman, Norman Garland, Gary M.
Maveal, Bridget McCormack, David A. Moran, Christopher B. Mueller, and
Roger C. Park, in Support of Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754958, at *22 n.12; Brief Amicus
Curiae of the ACLU and the ACLU of Virginia, in Support of Petitioner,
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (No. 98-5881), 1998 WL 901782, at
*26 & n.44. Though the history surrounding Brasier suggests that out-ofcourt statements of children should receive special treatment under the
Confrontation Clause, that issue is beyond the scope of this article.
34
Reply Brief of Petitioner Hershel Hammon, supra note 10, at *8;
Reply Brief for Petitioner [Davis], supra note 10, at *9.
35
Reply Brief of Petitioner Hershel Hammon, supra note 10, at *7-8;
accord Reply Brief for Petitioner [Davis], supra note 10, at *9 (“The NACC
brief (at 19-21), mentions other Old Bailey cases involving children’s
statements to family members, but the King’s Bench implicitly disapproved
these cases in [Brasier]. There, the full King’s Bench held that children’s outof-court accusations were admissible only if they testified. Since the victim
there had not been, in fact, ‘sworn or produced as a witness at trial,’ her
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The Court in Davis did not address any of these arguments.
It did, however, make one reference to Brasier. Responding to
defendant Davis’s argument that Brasier supported treating the
victim’s statements to the 911 operator as testimonial, the Court
said that Brasier “would be helpful to Davis if the relevant
statement had been the girl’s screams for aid as she was being
chased by her assailant. But by the time the victim got home,
her story was an account of past events.”36
Professor Friedman, counsel for one of the defendants in
Davis and a leading confrontation scholar, has interpreted this
reference in Davis as an “apparent endorsement” of Brasier.37
Friedman argues that the reference is significant because
“neither the immediacy of the statement, the youth of the
declarant, nor the private status of the audience removes the
statement from the protections of the confrontation right, and
that is as it should be.”38
Already, a state high court has relied on the Court’s
reference to Brasier to support its holding that statements to
non-law enforcement personnel can be “testimonial”:39
[I]n Davis the Court cited as authority decisions
suggesting that statements made to non-lawenforcement individuals may be testimonial and also
be subject to Confrontation Clause limitations . . . .
Furthermore, the Court said that readers should not
infer from the opinion that “statements made in the
absence of any interrogation are necessarily
accusatory statement was inadmissible.”).
36
Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006).
37
Richard D. Friedman, We Really (For the Most Part) Mean It!, 105
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 5 (2006), http://students.law.umich.
edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/friedman.pdf.
38
Id. at 5; accord Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way
Beyond, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 553, 564 (2007) (“[N]otwithstanding the
immediacy of the report—and notwithstanding the facts that the declarant was
a young child and that her audience included no law enforcement officers—
the statement was testimonial. Significantly, that is just how the Brasier court
referred to the child’s accusation, as testimony.”).
39
See discussion supra note 21.
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nontestimonial.” Until the U.S. Supreme Court holds
otherwise, we interpret the Court’s remarks to imply
that statements made to someone other than law
enforcement personnel may also be properly
characterized as testimonial.40
What Brasier means, therefore, is not simply a matter of
academic debate. But to understand the true meaning of the case
(to the extent possible), it must be read in the context of the law
of the time.
C. What Brasier Really Means (Probably)
Though academics debate the nuances of “originalism,” the
Supreme Court often treats “original meaning” as an inquiry
into the generally accepted meaning that a provision in the Bill
of Rights had at the time of ratification in 1791.41 In Crawford,
the Court examined the laws and practices of sixteenth through
eighteenth century England, as well as early post-ratification
state decisions that “shed light upon the original understanding
of the common law right.”42 Though Davis arguably retreated
somewhat from Crawford’s detailed historical focus,43 the Court
still sought to divine how the common law would treat the outof-court statements at issue.44
If the same analysis is applied to Brasier, the relevance of
the case to the Sixth Amendment confrontation right largely
collapses. Contextually, the Brasier statement, “no testimony
whatever can be legally received except upon oath,”45 did not
40

West Virginia v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 323 n.10 (W. Va. 2006)
(citations omitted).
41
Davies, What Did the Framers Know, supra note 26, at 105, 156-62
(noting that Supreme Court opinions often refer to the 1791 ratification date
but sometimes instead refer to the “framing” or “drafters” and 1789).
42
541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004).
43
Cf. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 n.5 (2006)
(“Restricting the Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it
was originally directed is a recipe for its extinction.”).
44
Id.
45
168 Eng. Rep. 202, 202, 1 Leach 199, 199 (K.B. 1779).
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characterize the child’s hearsay statements as “testimony,” or,
for that matter, even refer to the child’s statements at all.
Further, the testimony of the child’s mother and the lodger did
not appear in any report until well after ratification, rendering
post-ratification interpretations of Brasier on hearsay mostly
irrelevant.
1. The Law Leading Up to Brasier
To understand Brasier, the case must be read in the context
of seventeenth and eighteenth century English law governing
child competency. Before Brasier, courts followed a general rule
that a child under nine years old was incapable of taking the
oath and giving sworn testimony—effectively an irrebuttable
presumption of incompetency. A leading case on the issue was
Rex v. Travers, decided in 1726 (but first reported in 1755).46
There, the defendant was indicted for the rape of a six-year-old
girl, a capital offense.47 In the defendant’s first trial, the judge
refused to swear the child as a witness, and the defendant was
acquitted.48 Based on the same alleged conduct, the defendant
was then re-indicted for “assault with intent to ravish,” a
misdemeanor and non-capital offense.49 The Travers court
46

93 Eng. Rep. 793, 2 Strange 700 (K.B. 1726). The first two volumes
of the Strange reporter were published in 1755. W. HAROLD MAXWELL AND
LESLIE F. MAXWELL, A LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH
COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, ENGLISH LAW TO 1800 309 (2d ed. 1955).
47
93 Eng. Rep. at 793, 2 Strange at 700.
48
Id.
49
Id. The indictment for a lesser offense after an acquittal was permitted
during that time. As one commentator who studied rape trials during the
eighteenth century explained:
A court could try the rape defendant on either a felony or a
misdemeanour charge, but not on both in the same trial. This
position had its support in the rule that those accused of felonies,
unlike those accused of treason or misdemeanours, had, in theory
at least, no right to be defended by counsel . . . . [T]he
felony/misdemeanour rule was applied quite rigorously in the Old
Bailey from the middle of the [eighteenth] century on . . . .
...

6/22/2007 1:09 AM

FRANZE

510

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

considered whether the same general rule that prohibited
children under nine years old to be sworn in capital cases also
applied in trials for misdemeanor offenses.50 Chief Judge
Raymond held that the same presumption of incompetency
applied:
[A] person who could not be a witness in the one
case, could not in the other. The reason why the law
prohibits the evidence of a child so young is, because
the child cannot be presumed to distinguish betwixt
right and wrong: no person has ever been admitted as
a witness under the age of nine years, and very
seldom under ten.51

Under the rules of double jeopardy which prevailed at the time, a
defendant acquitted on a capital charge could subsequently be tried
for the same fact, if the subsequent charge was non-capital. Those
acquitted of rape could be, and sometimes were, tried for the
misdemeanour of assault with intent to commit rape.
Antony E. Simpson, Vulnerability and the Age of Female Consent: Legal
Innovation and Its Effect on Prosecutions for Rape In Eighteenth-Century
London, in SEXUAL UNDERWORLDS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 181, 187-90
(G.S. Rousseau & Roy Porter eds., Manchester Univ. Press (1987)).
50
Travers, 93 Eng. Rep. at 793-94, 2 Strange at 700-01.
51
Id. at 794, 2 Strange at 701. Two arguments were made in favor of
allowing the child to be sworn:
[1] Hale’s P.C. says, that the examination of one the age of nine
years has been admitted: and [2] a case at the Old Bailey 1698,
was cited, where upon such an indictment as this, Ward Chief
Baron admitted one to be a witness, who was under the age of
ten years, after the child had been examined about the nature of
an oath and had given a reasonable account of it.
Id., 2 Strange at 700-01. Chief Judge Raymond appeared to respond to each
point, first by refuting reliance on the 1698 Old Bailey case that reportedly
allowed a child to testify on the ground that a later Old Bailey case prohibited
unsworn testimony. Raymond noted that in a 1704 case, “this point was
thoroughly debated in the case of one Steward, who was indicted upon two
indictments for the rapes upon children” and the court barred the alleged
victims aged ten and six years old from taking the oath. Id. at 794, 2 Strange
at 701. He next noted that the only support existing for swearing a ten-yearold was Hale’s treatise. Id. These points are relevant because the reporter
annotations in Brasier cite to Travers and Hale. See King v. Brasier, 168
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The court held that the child was not permitted to testify and
“there not being evidence sufficient without her, the defendant
was acquitted.”52
The Travers case is relevant not only for its explicit holding
establishing an irrebutable presumption of incompetency for
children under a particular age, but also for its implicit holding
on a companion issue: whether an incompetent child could
provide testimony unsworn. Specifically, throughout the
eighteenth century, debate and confusion existed over whether
children who were incompetent to take the oath should
nevertheless be permitted to testify unsworn in certain types of
cases. The issue appears to have been prompted by an influential
treatise of the era, Sir Matthew Hale’s The History of the Pleas
of the Crown.53 Hale argued that children presumed incompetent
to take the oath should be allowed, at least in child sexual abuse
cases, to testify unsworn.54 Hale gave two principal reasons for
allowing unsworn testimony. First, in a point with modern
relevance,55 he argued that unsworn testimony should be allowed
Eng. Rep. 202, 202-03, 1 Leach 199, 200 (K.B. 1779); see also infra note
108 and accompanying text. Finally, it is notable that a reporter’s footnote
annotation in Travers references Brasier. Travers, 93 Eng. Rep. at 794 n.1, 2
Strange at 701 n.1 (“(1) Sed vide Brazier’s case, where an infant of 5 years
old was held a good witness by all the Judges, she appearing to be acquainted
with the nature of the obligation of the oath.”).
52
Travers, 93 Eng. Rep. at 794, 2 Strange at 701.
53
1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE [THE HISTORY
OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN] 634 (London, Prof’l Books Ltd. 1971) (1736).
54
Id. Hale noted that unsworn testimony would not be sufficient to
convict, but should be heard to provide the court information. Id. (“But if it
be an infant of such tender years, that in point of discretion the court sees
unfit to swear her, yet I think she ought to be heard without oath to give the
court information, tho singly of itself it ought not to move the jury to convict
the offender, nor is it in itself a sufficient testimony, because not upon oath,
without concurrence of other proofs, that may render the thing
probable . . . .”); accord 2 HALE, supra note 53, at 279 (“But in many cases
an infant of tender years may be examined without oath, where the exigence
of the case requires it, as in case of rape, buggery, witchcraft . . . .”).
55
See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) (“Child
abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part
because there often are no witnesses except the victim.”).
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because “[t]he nature of the offense, which is most times secret,
and no other testimony can be had of the very doing of the fact,
but the party upon whom it is committed . . . .”56 Second, and
most notably, Hale argued that children should be permitted to
testify unsworn because the law permitted admission of hearsay
of children reporting abuse, so courts may as well hear from the
children directly:
Because if the child complain presently of the wrong
done to her to the mother or other relations, their
evidence upon oath shall be taken, yet it is but a
narrative of what the child told them without oath,
and there is much more reason for the court to hear
the relation of the child herself, than to receive it as
second-hand from those that swear they heard her say
so; for such a relation may be falsified, or otherwise
represented at the second-hand, than when it was first
delivered.57
Hale’s treatise, written sometime before 1676, but not
published until 1736,58 was cited repeatedly for his arguments in
favor of hearing unsworn testimony from child victims. Both
William Blackstone and Francis Buller, who were among the
Twelve Judges who decided Brasier in 1779, cited Hale’s
arguments in their respective treatises. Various editions of
Blackstone’s Commentaries from the first edition (of the relevant
volume) in 1769 until the 1783 ninth English edition that was
changed to reflect Brasier,59 provided as follows:
56

1 HALE, supra note 53, at 634.
Id. at 634-35. Although advocating that courts allow child witnesses to
testify unsworn, Hale stated that concurrent proof was still required to prove
the offense and that sworn or unsworn testimony alone was insufficient to
convict a defendant of rape. Id. at 635 (“But in both these cases, whether the
infant be sworn or not, it is necessary to render their evidence credible, that
there should be concurrent evidence to make out the fact, and not to ground a
conviction singly upon such an accusation with or without oath of an
infant.”).
58
E.g., P.R. Glazebrook, Introduction to 1 HALE, supra note 53.
59
See discussion infra text accompanying note 117 (quoting 1783 ninth
English edition that was updated to discuss Brasier).
57
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[I]f the rape be charged to be committed on an infant
under twelve years of age, she may still be a
competent witness, if she hath sense and
understanding to know the nature and obligations of
an oath; and, even if she hath not, it is thought by Sir
Matthew Hale that she ought to be heard without
oath, to give the court information; though that alone
will not be sufficient to convict the offender. And he
is of this opinion, first, because the nature of the
offence being secret, there may be no other possible
proof of the actual fact; though afterwards there may
be concurrent circumstances to corroborate it, proved
by other witnesses: and, secondly, because the law
allows what the child told her mother, or other
relations, to be given in evidence, since the nature of
the case admits frequently of no better proof; and
there is much more reason for the court to hear the
narration of the child herself, than to receive it at
second hand from those who swear they heard her
say so.60

60

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
214 (1st ed. 1769). The English first edition of volume four, which contained
the quoted passage, was published in 1769. This passage remained in
subsequent editions until the English ninth edition of volume four, published
in 1783, which was updated to discuss Brasier. 1 MAXWELL & MAXWELL,
supra note 46, at 27-28. This English 1783 ninth edition was the last to
contain Blackstone’s alterations before he died.
The American first edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries, published in
Philadelphia in 1772, was the same as the first 1769 English edition of
volume four, and contained the passage quoted. The next American edition
was published in Worcester in 1790 and was the same as the 1783 English
ninth edition, which contained Blackstone’s final alterations and revision
discussing Brasier. ELDON REVARE JAMES, A LIST OF LEGAL TREATISES
PRINTED IN THE BRITISH COLONIES AND THE AMERICAN STATES BEFORE 1801
16-17 (Harvard Univ. Press 1934).
By most accounts, however, before the first American edition was ever
published in 1772, over 1,000 copies of prior English editions were imported
into the colonies. Randy J. Holland, Anglo-American Templars: Common
Law Crusaders, 8 DEL. L. REV. 137, 148 (2006); accord Steve Sheppard,
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Similarly, the various editions of Buller’s treatise, An
Introduction to the Law Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius,61 cited
Hale from the 1772 edition until it was updated in the 1790
edition to discuss Brasier,62 for the possibility that courts might
receive unsworn testimony from children:
[I]t seems to be settled, that a Child under the Age of
ten shall in no Case be admitted; but after that Age,
Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An Introductory History of
Law in the Lecture Hall, 82 IOWA L. REV. 547, 561 (1997) (“The
Commentaries were an immediate success in America. Robert Bell, a
Philadelphia printer, sold subscriptions for fifteen hundred copies throughout
America, even though Americans had already bought more than one thousand
copies of English editions . . . . For the next five decades, scores of
annotated Commentaries poured forth.” (footnotes omitted)); Albert W.
Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996) (“One
thousand copies of the English edition of Blackstone were sold in the
American Colonies before the first American edition appeared in 1772. This
edition supplied another 1400 sets at a substantially lower price; and one year
before the Declaration of Independence, Edmund Burke remarked in
Parliament that nearly as many copies of the Commentaries had been sold on
the American as on the English side of the Atlantic.” (footnotes omitted)).
The Commentaries unquestionably influenced the Framers. See, e.g.,
Alschuler, supra at 2 (“[A]ll of our formative documents—the Declaration of
Independence, the Constitution, the Federalist Papers, and the seminal
decisions of the Supreme Court under John Marshall—were drafted by
attorneys steeped in [Blackstone’s Commentaries].” (citations omitted)); Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23 (1957) (“[T]wo of the greatest English jurists,
Lord Chief Justice Hale and Sir William Blackstone
. . . exerted
considerable influence on the Founders . . . .”). It is likely that at the time of
the framing any number of editions were in use. For an example of the
numerous and tangled history of the various editions, see generally The Law
Library Microform Consortium at http://www.llmc.com/yale.htm#page_11
(bibliography of Yale’s Blackstone Collection).
61
This treatise was actually a revision of Henry Bathurst’s The Theory of
Evidence (1761), which Bathurst later republished in expanded form in 1767
in An Introduction to the Law Relative to Nisi Prius. Buller was Bathurst’s
nephew and took over the treatise under his own name in 1772. There were
multiple editions over the next several decades. See LANGBEIN, supra note
15, at 212 n.150; T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA
L. REV. 499, 531 n.238 (1999).
62
See infra text accompanying note 129 (quoting 1790 edition that was
updated to discuss Brasier).
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if the Child appear to have any Notion of the
Obligation of an Oath, after there has been a
Foundation laid by other Witnesses to induce a
Suspicion, the Child shall be admitted to prove the
Fact. Doubtless the Court will more readily admit
such a Child in the Case of a personal Injury (such as
Rape) than on a Question between other Parties; and
perhaps, in Such Case, would even admit the Infant
to be examined without Oath [margin cite to Hale];
for certainly there is much more Reason for the Court
to hear the Relation of the Child, than to receive it at
second hand from those that heard it say so. In Cases
of foul acts done in secret, where the Child is the
Party injured, the repelling their Evidence entirely is,
in some Measure, denying them the Protection of
Law . . . .63
Hale’s argument also made its way into criminal trials. In
Omychund v. Barker64 in 1744 (first reported in 1765), for
example, counsel cited Hale as support for the proposition that
unsworn testimony can be received in evidence.65 The judges
rejected the argument on the ground that Hale’s rule had not
been followed in trials in London’s Old Bailey court.66
The Old Bailey trials,67 however, reflect otherwise. In child
63

FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO
TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS 288-89 (London, W. Strahan & M. Woodfall Printers
to the King) (1772).
64
1 Atk. 21 (K.B. 1744). The first three volumes of the Atkyns reporter
were published in 1765. 1 MAXWELL & MAXWELL, supra note 46, at 344.
65
Omychund, 1 Atk. at 29.
66
Id. (“Lord Chief Justice Lee interrupted the Attorney General, and
said, it was determined at the Old Bailey upon mature consideration, that a
child should not be admitted as evidence without oath. Lord Chief Baron
Parker likewise said, it was so ruled at Kingston assizes before Lord
Raymond, where upon an indictment for a rape he refused the evidence of a
child without oath.”). The latter is a reference to the Travers case. See supra
text accompanying notes 46-52.
67
“The Old Bailey was the London-area equivalent of the provincial
assize court.” LANGBEIN, supra note 15, at 17. The court had a heavy
caseload:
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rape prosecutions, the Old Bailey Session Papers68 report trials
from 1678,69 1720,70 1762,71 1766,72 1768,73 and 176974
[T]he Old Bailey sat eight times a year whereas assizes sat twice
a year. In the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the
Old Bailey, which was the felony trial court for London and the
surrounding county of Middlesex, processed between twelve and
twenty jury trials per day through a single courtroom.
Id.
68

The Old Bailey Session Papers (“OBSP”) are pamphlet accounts of
trials that were produced for the general public. LANGBEIN, supra note 15, at
182-90. These reports varied in format and detail over time and have many
limitations, including that they summarize the trials, reflect only a selection
of cases, and focus primarily on the underlying facts, not the legal practices
and procedures in place. See id.; accord Gallanis, supra note 61, at 553-54
(“For the years before 1800, the OBSP are particularly useful . . . . In the
nineteenth century, however, the OBSP tended increasingly to summarize the
testimony presented at trial, rather than reproducing it in a more verbatim
fashion.”). Professor Langbein has noted that rape cases often were reported
with more detail in the OBSP, perhaps in the publishers’ efforts to cultivate a
popular market. LANGBEIN, supra note 15, at 198. For a study of rape trials
in the Old Bailey from 1730 to 1830, see Simpson, supra note 49, at 188.
69
Rex v. Arrowsmith, OBSP (Dec. 11, 1678), available at
http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1670s/t16781211e-2.html. The child
witnesses in Arrowsmith ultimately testified under oath, but the case reflects
that the trial judge determined that receiving unsworn testimony was proper.
Id. Specifically, the defendant was charged with rape of an eight-year-old.
The victim and nine-year-old friend were initially heard unsworn. Id. The
jury expressed concern that they were unsworn since the only other evidence
was hearsay. Id. The court defended the admission of the unsworn testimony,
telling the jury that “in regard to such Offenders never call other to be by
while they commit such actions, they could expect no other Testimony from
the Party injured, which they had, and with it an eye Witness, both whom
they forbore to Swear, because of the tenderness of their Age; but if they
insisted upon, they should be Sworn.” Id. The court had the children sworn
and reexamined them, and the defendant was convicted of rape. Id.
70
Rex v. Beesley, OBSP (Apr. 27, 1720), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1720s/t17200427-38.html. The defendant was
charged with rape of a ten-year-old girl. Id. The court asked the child if she
understood the oath, and she did not. Id. Nevertheless, the court permitted
her to testify, and she stated that the defendant had sexually assaulted her on
two occasions. Id. The court also permitted hearsay evidence of a witness
who testified “that the Girl told her the Prisoner had done the Wrong
complained of.” Id. The defendant was acquitted. Id.
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wherein the court permitted child victims of sexual abuse to
testify unsworn. In Rex v. Stringer, for instance, the defendant
was charged with rape of a seven-year-old girl.75 “The child was
examined, but not upon oath, who said she carried a pot down
into the cellar, the prisoner there took her and set her on a box
and kissed her, and put his private parts to her’s, but did not put
it into her.”76 The defendant was acquitted of the capital offense
of rape, but re-indicted for the misdemeanor offense of assault
with the intent to commit a rape.77
71

Rex v. Smith, OBSP (Apr. 21, 1762), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1760s/t17620421-11.html. The defendant was
charged with rape of a five-year-old girl. The “child [was] examined but not
sworn” and testified that the defendant “said I must not tell my mamma. He
laid me down on my back and hurt my groin, and put his cock to me.” Id.
The defendant was permitted to cross-examine the child and ultimately was
acquitted of rape, but “detained to be tried at Hick’s-hall for an assault with
an intent to commit a rape on the child.” Id.
72
Rex v. Brophy, OBSP (Sept. 3, 1766), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1760s/t17660903-38.html. The defendant was
charged with rape of a ten-year-old girl. At trial, a witness testified that, after
originally denying anyone had assaulted her, the girl “said it was Ned.” Id.
A doctor testified that “[s]he said the man had been concerned with her,
mentioning the name Brophy; upon which I asked her where; she said in the
cellar; she told me the day, but I do not recollect it.” Id. The defendant
cross-examined the witnesses. The child testified, “not upon oath” about the
rape. The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to death. Id.
73
Rex v. Stringer, OBSP (Apr. 13, 1768), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1760s/t17680413-47.html. See infra text accompanying
notes 75-76.
74
Rex v. Gyles, OBSP (Apr. 5, 1769), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1760s/t17690405-49.html. The defendant was
charged with rape of an eight-year-old girl. “The child was examined but not
upon oath; the account she gave was short of proving the fact. Acquitted.”
Id.
75
Stringer, OBSP.
76
Id.
77
One review of child rape cases reported in the OBSP found that most
of the cases resulted in acquittal. See Simpson, supra note 49, at 188 (finding
82 percent acquittal rate in rape cases involving victims under ten years old).
One explanation for the low conviction rate may be that conviction required
proof of penetration. 1 HALE, supra note 53, at 628 (“To make a rape there
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On the other hand, several other Old Bailey reports reflect
that children often were not permitted to testify unsworn. In
many of these trials, the children’s accounts were the only
evidence, and defendants were acquitted.78
must be an actual penetration . . . .”). Some of the Old Bailey trials reflect
concern over proof of penetration. See case cited infra note 81. Beyond the
evidentiary difficulty of proving penetration, acquittal rates may be explained,
in part, on “the sense that juries may have thought the capital sanction too
hard . . . .” LANGBEIN, supra note 15, at 240 n.276. This view is consistent
with a practice reflected in some OBSP cases, where the jury acquitted the
defendant of rape, but the defendant was detained for another trial for assault
with the intent to commit a rape, a non-capital misdemeanor offense. See
cases cited supra and infra notes 71, 73, 78 (Foster), 82-88, 102. The
practice of retrial on misdemeanor charges also suggests that while unsworn
testimony of a child or hearsay statements by themselves were not considered
sufficient to convict for a capital crime, they might have been considered
sufficient for misdemeanor offenses. See cases cited infra notes 82 (issuing a
sentence for the misdemeanor charges), 93 (finding the prisoner guilty of
assault).
78
E.g., Rex v. Linsey, OBSP (Sept. 12, 1750), available at
http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1750s/t17500912-29.html (reporting
case involving defendant charged with rape of a seven-year-old; “The child
was not capable of being admitted to give its evidence upon oath, and there
being no other evidence, the prisoner was acquitted.”); Rex v. White, OBSP
(June 25, 1752), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/
1750s/t17520625-30.html (reporting case involving defendant charged with
rape of an eleven-year-old; a doctor testified about the presence of a venereal
disease, but the “child could not be examined upon oath, not knowing the
nature of an oath. The prisoner was acquitted.”); Rex v. Foster, OBSP (Dec.
12, 1764) available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1760s/
t17641212-63.html (reporting case involving defendant charged with rape of a
five-year-old; “The Surgeon that had inspected the child did not appear, nor
any one else that had inspected her; and the child being too young to be
examined, the prisoner was Acquitted. He was detained to be tried for an
assault with intent to commit a Rape.”); Rex v. Crother, OBSP (Sept. 7,
1774),
available
at
http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1770s/
t17740907-63.html (reporting case involving defendant charged with rape of a
four-year-old; “The girl being too young to give her testimony upon oath, the
prisoner who is but twelve years of age, was Acquitted.”); Rex v. Davies,
OBSP (Sept. 11, 1776), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/
html_units/1770s/t17760911-71.html (reporting case involving defendant
charged with rape of a six-year-old; “There was no evidence to prove the
charge but the testimony of the child, who was not of sufficient age to be
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In most of the child rape trials in the Old Bailey Session
Papers, however, the court followed the practice, identified by
Hale, of allowing hearsay of “incompetent” children to be
admitted as evidence. Reports from trials in 1721,79 1724,80
1735,81 1750,82 1751,83 1754,84 1757,85 1765,86 1768,87 and
examined under oath. Not guilty.”).
79
Rex v. Robbins, OBSP (Jan. 13, 1721), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1720s/t17210113-28.html. The defendant was
charged with rape of a seven-year-old girl. The child’s mother testified that
the child said, “the Prisoner [had] put his finger into the place where she
made Water, and also put the thing with which he made Water, into the Place
where she made Water.” Id. The jury acquitted the defendant after hearing
from several witnesses. Id.
80
Rex v. Nichols, OBSP (Feb. 26, 1724), available at http://www.oldbailey-online.org/html_units/1720s/t17240226-73.html. For a discussion of
Nichols, see infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
81
Rex v. Gray, OBSP (Sept. 11, 1735), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1730s/t17350911-53.html. The defendant was
charged with rape of an eight-year-old girl. The child’s mother testified that
upon examining the child’s genitals, which showed symptoms of venereal
disease, the child “fell on her Knees, and said that one Gray did it.” Id.
After hearing testimony from doctors concerning the lack of evidence of
penetration, the jury acquitted the defendant. Id.
82
Rex v. Tankling, OBSP (July 11, 1750), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1750s/t17500711-25.html. The defendant was
charged with rape of a girl under four years old. A doctor testified that:
I examined the child and the prisoner, they were both foul. The
child said, the prisoner hurt her very much with his cock . . . .
....
The infant not being capable of giving evidence, the prisoner
was acquitted; and by order of the court there was another
indictment preferred against him at Hicks’s-hall for an intent to
commit rape, and giving the child the foul disease. The
prisoner was there cast to be confined in the prison of Newgate
[for] three years . . . .
Id.
83
Rex v. Larkin, OBSP (July 3, 1751), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1750s/t17510703-21.html. The defendant was
charged with rape of a ten-year-old girl. A neighbor testified that the child
“said, he was very impudent,” and another woman who lived with the
neighbor “went on and confirmed her account.” Id. The child “was not
admitted to be sworn,” and the defendant acquitted, but indicted for a
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177188 reflect that child victims’ family members, doctors,
neighbors, or others were allowed to testify about what children
had told them. In 1724, for instance, the defendant in Rex v.
Nichols89 was on trial for the rape of a five-year-old girl.90 The
misdemeanor. Id.
84
Rex v. Kirk, OBSP (May 30, 1754), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1750s/t17540530-36.html. The defendant was
charged with rape of a girl under seven years old. “[T]he child being so
young and not knowing the nature of an oath, could not be examined.” Id.
The child’s mother, however, testified that “[t]he child told me he used to put
his hands up her petticoats,” and another woman testified that “[t]he child
told me he had done it to her as mentioned by the last evidence.” Id. The
court ultimately concluded that “[t]here being no other evidence against the
prisoner than hearsay from the child’s mouth it was not judged sufficient; he
was therefore acquitted, but detained to be tried on another indictment at
Hick’s-Hall for an assault with an intent to commit a rape.” Id.
85
Rex v. Crosby, OBSP (Dec. 7, 1757), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1750s/t17571207-14.html. The defendant was
charged with rape of a ten-year-old girl. The child’s mother testified that the
child said, “Mr. Crosby did it, the day his wife went to the hospital, and left
me there; he got into bed and call[ed] me to him. I went to him. Then he
pulled me to him, and put his c-k in me there, and hurt me sadly.” Id. The
court noted that “the child being but nine years and three quarters old, and
not being examined upon oath, he was acquitted; but detained to be tried next
session for an assault upon the child with an intent to commit a rape.” Id.
86
Rex v. Tibbel, OBSP (Oct. 16, 1765), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1760s/t17651016-2.html. The defendant was
charged with rape of a four-year-old girl. The child’s mother testified that “I
asked her who had hurt her? She said, Sam had hurt her, that is the
prisoner . . . .” Id. Other witnesses testified that the defendant had confessed
to raping the child. The jury acquitted the defendant, but he was detained to
be tried for assault with intent to commit a rape. Id.
87
Rex v. Allam, OBSP (Sept. 7, 1768) available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1760s/t17680907-40.html. The defendant was
charged with rape of an eight-year-old girl. The child’s mother testified that
“the child then said, William Allam had had to do with her in the shed two
days before . . . .” Id. The defendant was acquitted, but detained to be tried
for assault with intent to commit a rape. Id.
88
Rex v. Craige, OBSP (July 3, 1771), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1770s/t17710703-33.html. For a discussion of
Craige, see infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
89
Rex v. Nichols, OBSP (Feb. 26, 1724), available at http://www.old-
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child did not appear, but her mother testified that the child “told
her the Prisoner had made her kneel upon his knees had taken
up her coats, and had hurt her sadly.”91 A doctor was permitted
to testify “that the child did say it had been done to her by the
Prisoner.”92 The court reportedly found that “[t]he child being
too young to swear to the fact, the jury acquitted him of the
rape, but found him guilty of the assault.”93 Nearly fifty years
later, in Rex v. Craige,94 a defendant was on trial for the rape of
a girl who was under ten years old. The girl’s neighbor testified,
she said “I will tell you who it was if you won’t tell my dada; I
said I would not, but would tell her mama. She said it was Mr.
Craige.”95
Further reflecting the inconsistent application of law during
this period, a few Old Bailey reports show that hearsay of child
victims was deemed inadmissible. In 1754,96 during the trial of
the defendant for rape of a nine-year-old girl, the child’s mother
started to testify that she tried to get the child to explain what
had happened to her, but the court intervened, stating “[y]ou
must not tell what the girl said, that is not evidence.”97
Beyond these reports of actual trials, the issue concerning
allowing unsworn testimony was reflected in the 1770 edition of
an influential English justice of the peace manual. This manual
cited Travers and Omychund for the proposition that unsworn
testimony of children could not be admitted “as evidence,” but
cited Hale in support of allowing unsworn testimony to provide
information to the court “where the exigence of the case
baileyonline.org/html_units/1720s/t17240226-73.html.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
OBSP
(July
3,
1771),
available
at
http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1770s/t17710703-33.html.
95
Id. The defendant ultimately was acquitted of rape but detained for
trial for assault with intent to ravish a different child.
96
Rex v. Grimes, OBSP (May 30, 1754), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1750s/t17540530-1.html.
97
Id.

6/22/2007 1:09 AM

FRANZE

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

522

requires it . . . especially in cases of rape, buggery, and such
crimes as are practiced upon children.”98
98

1 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER
487 (11th ed. 1770). The first edition in 1755 simply cited Hale in support of
allowing unsworn testimony:
But if an infant be of age of 14 years, he is as to this purpose,
of the age of discretion, to be sworn as a witness; but if under
that age, yet if it appear, that he hath a competent discretion, he
may be sworn. 2 H.H. 278.
And in many cases an infant of tender years may be examined
without oath, where the exigence of the case requires it; which
possibly, being fortified with concurrent evidences, may be of
some weight; especially in cases of rape, buggery, and such
crimes as are practiced upon children. 2 H.H. 279, 284.
1 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 190 (1st
ed. 1755); cf. 2 HALE, supra note 53, at 279 (“But in many cases an infant
of tender years may be examined without oath, where the exigence of the
case requires it, as in case of rape, buggery, witchcraft . . . .”). By the
eighth edition in 1764, the quote remained the same, but a citation to the
Travers case, which was first published in 1755, was added. 1 RICHARD
BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 342 (8th ed. 1764)
(“especially in cases of rape, buggery, and such crimes as are practiced upon
children. 2 H.H. 279, 284. Str. 700.”); see also supra notes 46-52 and
accompanying text (discussing Travers).
The 1766 tenth edition was updated to incorporate the Travers and
Omychund decisions. The following shows how the 1766 edition was updated
from the prior editions:
But if an infant be of age of 14 years, he is as to this purpose of
the age of discretion, to be sworn as a witness; but if under that
age, yet if it appear, that he hath a competent discretion, he may
be sworn. 2 H.H. 278.
And in many cases an infant of tender years may be examined
without oath, where the exigence of the case requires it; which
possibly, being fortified with concurrent evidences, may be of
some weight; especially in cases of rape, buggery, and such
crimes as are practiced upon children. 2 H.H. 279, 284. Str.
700.
But in no case shall an infant be admitted as evidence, without
oath. Str. 700 [Travers], Tracy Atk. 29 [Omychund].
The changes reflected in the 1766 tenth edition are not entirely clear given
that the deletion of the words “without oath” may suggest that no unsworn
testimony could be received. More likely, the 1766 manual is attempting to
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By 1775, the issue was coming to a head. In King v.
Powell,99 the defendant was tried for rape of a six-year-old.
Since the child was presumed by law incompetent, “she was
admitted to give her evidence against the prisoner without being
sworn,”100 but the defendant was acquitted nonetheless. Judge
Gould “mentioned the case to the [Twelve] Judges; and the
majority of them were of opinion, that in criminal cases no
reconcile Hale’s views with Travers and Omychund and drawing a distinction
between admitting unsworn testimony as “evidence” rather than as
“information” that would be insufficient to secure a conviction.
American justice of the peace manuals were based on Burn’s manual and
many were copied verbatim from Burn’s 1770 (or later) editions’ discussion
of unsworn testimony. See JOSEPH GREENLEAF, AN ABRIDGMENT OF BURN’S
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 124 (Boston 1773); RICHARD
STARKE, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE 144 (Virginia
1774); JOHN GRIMKE, THE SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE 192 (1788);
ELIPHALET LADD, BURN’S ABRIDGEMENT OR THE AMERICAN JUSTICE 143
(1792); WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 177-78
(1795). At least a few manuals, however, were copied verbatim from earlier
editions and contain a discussion of unsworn testimony identical to the 1755
edition of Burn’s manual quoted above. JAMES PARKER, CONDUCTOR
GENERALIS 167 (Woodbridge, N.J. 1764); CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 170 (New
York 1788, printed by John Patterson for Robert Hodge); THE CONDUCTOR
GENERALIS 140 (New York, 1788, printed by Hugh Gaine). I am indebted to
Professor Davies for alerting me to these sources.
99
168 Eng. Rep. 157, 1 Leach 110 (K.B. 1775).
100
Id. at 157, 1 Leach at 110. A reporter’s annotation in Powell
provides:
(a) Lord Hale, vol i. page 634 says, That if an infant appear
unfit to be sworn, the Court ought to hear her information
without oath; but he admits that such evidence is not of itself
sufficient testimony to convict, because it was not upon oath. In
the argument in Omychund v. Barker, Mich Term 1744, it was
said by L.C. J. Lee, that it was determined at the Old Bailey,
upon mature consideration, that a child cannot be admitted as a
witness except upon oath; and L.C.B. Parker likewise said, that
it was so ruled at Kingston Assizes before Lord Raymond
[Travers], where, upon and indictment for a rape, he refused the
evidence of a child without oath, 1 Atkins, 21. See also the case
of The King v. Steward, 1 Strange, 701, and The King v.
Brasier, post, Summer Assize, Reading, 1778.
Id. at 158, 1 Leach at 111.
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testimony can be received except upon oath.”101 Thus, by 1775,
a split court of the Twelve Judges suggested in essentially dicta
(since the defendant in Powell was acquitted)102 that an
101

Id. at 158, 1 Leach at 110.
Like Brasier, however, the version of Powell in the first edition of
Leach’s Crown Cases differed from the version in the English Reports. The
first version reported that the defendant was convicted. See Davies, Not the
Framers’ Design, supra note 26, at 446 n.238. In 1793, a much more
detailed account of defendant Powell’s trial appeared in a reporter that
collected reports of trials involving “adultery, incest, imbecility, ravishment.”
See 2 CUCKOLD’S CHRONICLE 440-46 (1793). This report indicates that the
trial judge in Powell recognized a longstanding dispute over whether to allow
unsworn testimony, but allowed the child to testify unsworn so that the issue
could finally be resolved by the Twelve Judges if the defendant was
convicted. The judge reportedly quoted the section of Hale’s treatise
advocating the admission of unsworn testimony and noted a conflict with the
Travers case which had precluded the admission of such testimony. The judge
noted, however, that Travers was decided before Hale’s treatise was
published. Id. at 441. The court also reportedly decided not to be bound by
Travers since he was aware of a dispute among the Twelve Judges
concerning the admission of unsworn testimony:
I should have thought myself bound by that case [Travers], if I
had not known the question much doubted of, and debated
among the [Twelve] Judges: some hold it one way, and some
another. I do think it is a point that ought to be considered and
settled. I am at present inclined to follow the opinion of the
King and Travers, but am aware that case is not approved by all
the Judges; and therefore, in so very important a question of
this, I think, in point of prudence, it should be settled; for we
have too many instance of offenses of this kind.
Id. at 442. The judge reportedly also addressed Hale’s view about child
hearsay:
With regard to admitting the declaration of the child to the
mother, Lord Hale speaks of that as a clear and settled thing;
for, he says, if you hear the child at second hand, she should be
heard also at first hand . . . . I am of the present of opinion, not
only to hear the evidence of the woman [the child’s mother], but
likewise to examine the child without oath: and, if the matter
rests upon that, make a case for the opinion of the Judges.
Id at 442. The judge allowed the child’s mother to testify about what the
child had told her and also permitted the six-year-old child to testify
unsworn. Id. at 442-43, 445. “The Jury, however, brought him in Not
102
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incompetent child should not be permitted to testify unsworn.
Four years later, the Twelve Judges decided Brasier.
2. Brasier Read in Context
In 1779, the Twelve Judges considered Brasier, another case
involving a young child who was presumed incompetent under
the rule followed in the Travers case. Read divorced from the
child competency issues of the time, Brasier appears to address
only two issues. First, the case appears to address the age at
which a child may be sworn. The Twelve Judges rejected the
rule in Travers and held, “there is no precise or fixed rule as to
the time within which infants are excluded from giving
evidence.”103 Second, the Brasier case appears to address a
hearsay question, where the court held that “no testimony
whatever can be legally received except upon oath” and then
stated that the trial judge should have excluded the testimony of
the mother and lodger.104
Considered in the context of Sir Matthew Hale’s argument
that children should be permitted to testify unsworn, the preBrasier Blackstone and Buller commentary, the inconsistent
treatment of unsworn statements in the Old Bailey trials, and
Powell’s recognition of division on the issue, Brasier also should
be interpreted as resolving the prevailing issue about unsworn
testimony. This is important because it reflects that the statement
“no testimony whatever can be legally received except upon
oath”—which many have assumed characterized the hearsay as
“testimony” and therefore relevant under Crawford’s
Guilty. Another indictment was found against him, for violently assaulting
and abusing the said Margaret Edson; of which he was found guilty at the
next Assizes.” Id. at 446. Thus, this more detailed report suggests the later
edition of Leach’s containing Powell correctly reported that the defendant was
acquitted. The earlier report may have improperly suggested a conviction
based on the re-indictment and retrial for the misdemeanor offense, a practice
not uncommon in sexual abuse cases during the time. See discussion supra
note 77.
103
King v. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. 202, 203, 1 Leach 199, 200 (K.B.
1779).
104
Id. at 202, 1 Leach at 200.
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testimonial/nontestimonial dichotomy—was simply referring to
the ability of young Mary Harris or any other incompetent child
to testify unsworn. The Twelve Judges were stating that no one
can give testimony if not sworn, not that the hearsay was
“testimony.”
The Brasier report itself confirms as much by including in
the reporter’s annotations citations to the relevant pages in
Hale’s treatise,105 the Omychund case,106 the Travers case,107 and
other sources108 that addressed whether children could testify
105

See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
107
See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
108
The reporter notes in Brasier cite to several sources:
The prisoner was convicted; but the judgment was respited, on a
doubt, created by a marginal note to a case in Dyer’s Reports
(Dyer, 303, b, in marg; 1 Hale, 302, 634; 2 Hale, 279; 11
Mod. 228; 1 Atkins, 29; Foster, 70; 2 Hawk. 612; Gilb. L. E.
144); for these notes having been made by Lord Chief-Justice
Treby, are considered of great weight and authority; and it was
submitted to the Twelve Judges, Whether this evidence was
sufficient in point of law?
168 Eng. Rep. at 202, 1 Leach at 200.
The citations to Hale reference the pages involving the age at which a
child can be sworn and Hale’s argument that a child should be permitted to
testify unsworn. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (quoting 1
Hale 634 and 2 Hale 279). The cite to “11 Mod, 228” is Young v.
Slaughterford, which involved a question concerning the age at which a child
could be sworn. The cite to “1 Atkins, 29,” is the Omychund case, in which
the court addressed Hale’s argument about children being unsworn. See supra
text accompanying notes 64-66 (discussing Omychund). The cite to “Foster,
70” is reference to The Case of William York, involving a prosecution of a
ten-year-old for the murder of a five-year-old. The relation to Brasier is
unclear, though perhaps because the boy confessed and declarations
containing hearsay of his confessions were admitted, it related to the ability
of a court to hear unsworn testimony. Next are references to Hawkins and
Gilbert’s treatises, which discuss the age at which a child may be sworn.
Finally, the marginal note was based on a note in Dyer’s Report at 303b.
That page of Dyer’s I located (likely a different edition) contains no relevant
discussion. But the next page contains a reference to a child rape case that
“[a] man of sixty years old who had a wife, was arraigned at Newgate . . .
for the rape of a girl then of the age of seven years, and no more; and was
106
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unsworn.
More importantly, it is possible (albeit questionable) that the
child in Brasier did, in fact, testify unsworn. To be sure, the
report of Brasier in the English Reports that was discussed by
the Supreme Court and litigants in Davis states that Mary Harris
“was not sworn or produced as a witness on the trial.”109 In the
course of my discussions about Brasier with Professor Thomas
Davies, however, he identified an earlier report of Brasier that
appeared in the 1789 first edition of Leach’s Crown Cases. This
original report says nothing about the mother and the lodger
providing out-of-court statements of Mary Harris, but instead
indicates that the child testified unsworn:
This was a case reserved for the opinion of the
Twelve Judges, by Mr. Justice Gould, at the Summer
Assizes for York in the year ___, [blank in original]
on the trial of an indictment for a rape on the body of
an infant under seven years of age. The information
of the infant was received in evidence against the
prisoner; but as she had not attained the years of
presumed discretion, and did not appear to possess
sufficient understanding to be aware of the dangers of
perjury, she was not sworn.
The prisoner was convicted; but the judgment was
respited, on a doubt, Whether evidence, under any
circumstances whatever, could be legally admitted in
a criminal prosecution except upon oath?
The Judges were unanimously of opinion, That no
testimony whatever can be legally received except
upon oath; and that an infant, though under the age of
found guilty by apparent evidence of divers women and a surgeon, and the
girl herself; and hanged by the neck.” 3 Dyer 304a n.51. Since the child was
under nine, presumably she was incompetent as a matter of law, but
permitted to testify unsworn. In one of the reports concerning Powell’s case,
which reported that the Twelve Judges were split on whether a child could
testify unsworn, the trial judge reportedly noted a case reported at page 304
of Dyer in its analysis of the on-going debate about unsworn testimony of
children. See CUCKOLD’S CHRONICLE, supra note 102, at 441.
109
Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. at 202, 1 Leach at 200.
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seven years, may be sworn in a criminal prosecution,
provided such infant appears, on strict examination by
the Court, to possess a sufficient knowledge of the
nature and consequences of an oath: for there is no
precise or fixed rule as to the time within which
infants are excluded from giving evidence; but their
admissibility depends upon the sense and reason they
entertain of the danger and impiety of falsehood,
which is to be collected from their answers to
questions propounded to them by the Court; but if
they are found incompetent, their testimony cannot be
received.110
Upon further research, I located two other Leach’s reports of
the case from 1792 and 1800, respectively. These versions
differed slightly from the 1789 report, but similarly state that
Mary Harris testified at trial.111
110

Id. (emphasis added). There were four editions of Leach’s Cases in
Crown Law: the first edition (1730-1789), second edition (1730-1791), the
third edition (1730-1800), and the fourth edition (1730-1815). 1 MAXWELL &
MAXWELL, supra note 46, at 303. The English Reports reprinted only the
fourth edition of Leach’s likely because it was viewed as the most accurate.
ROY M. MERSKY AND DONALD J. DUNN, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL
RESEARCH 512 (8th ed. 2002) (“English Reports . . . . This is a reprint of
the nominate reports from 1220 to 1865. When there were competing sets of
reports, the editors included only the set they deemed most accurate.”); see
also JOHN WILLIAM WALLACE, THE COMMON LAW REPORTERS 430 (Soule
and Bugbee eds. 1882) (describing Leach’s: “There are editions in 1789,
1792, 1800, and perhaps other years; the best and most complete is in 2 vols.
8vo, 1815.”).
111
The following shows how the 1792 report in Leach’s was updated
from the 1789 report:
This was a case reserved for the opinion of the Twelve Judges,
by Mr. Justice Gould, at the Summer Assizes for York in the
year 1778, on the trial of an indictment for a rape on the body
of an infant under seven years of age. The information of the
infant was received in evidence against the prisoner; but as she
had not attained the years of presumed discretion, and did not
appear to possess sufficient understanding to be aware of the
dangers of perjury, she was not sworn.
The prisoner was convicted; but the judgment was respited, on a
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doubt, Whether evidence, under any circumstances whatever,
could be legally admitted in a criminal prosecution except upon
oath?
The Judges assembled at Serjeants-Inn Hall 12, April 1779,
were unanimously of opinion, That no testimony whatever can
be legally received except upon oath; and that an infant, though
under the age of seven years, may be sworn in a criminal
prosecution, provided such infant appears, on strict examination
by the Court, to possess a sufficient knowledge of the nature and
consequences of an oath: for there is no precise or fixed rule as
to the time within which infants are excluded from giving
evidence; but their admissibility depends upon the sense and
reason they entertain of the danger and impiety of falsehood,
which is to be collected from their answers to questions
propounded to them by the Court; but if they are found
incompetent to take an oath, their testimony cannot be received.
They determined, therefore, that the information of the infant,
which had been given in evidence in the present case, ought not
to have been received.
King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 182-83 (K.B. rev. ed. 1792). The following shows
how the 1800 report was updated from the 1792 report.
This was a case reserved for the opinion of the Twelve Judges,
by Mr. Justice Buller Gould, at the Summer Assizes for Reading
York in the year 1778, on the trial of an indictment for a rape
on the body of an infant under seven years of age.
The information information of the infant was received in
evidence against the prisoner; but as she had not attained the
years of presumed discretion, and did not appear to possess
sufficient understanding to be aware of the dangers of perjury,
she was not sworn. [reporter’s footnote]
The prisoner was convicted; but the judgment was respited, on a
doubt, created by a marginal note to a case in Dyer’s Reports;
for these notes having been made by Lord Chief Justice Treby,
are considered of great weight and authority; and it was
submitted to the Twelve Judges,Whether evidence, under any
circumstances whatever, could be legally admitted in a criminal
prosecution except upon oath?
The Judges assembled at Sergeants-Inn Hall 12, April 1779,
were unanimously of opinion, That no testimony whatever can
be legally received except upon oath; and that an infant, though
under the age of seven years, may be sworn in a criminal
prosecution, provided such infant appears, on strict examination
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In total, there is the original report in the 1789 edition of
Leach’s,112 slightly different versions in the 1792 and 1800
editions of Leach’s,113 and a fourth version in the 1815 edition
of Leach’s. This last version from 1815 was reprinted in the
English Reports and typically is cited today as the Brasier case.
Again, these reports reflect material changes over time. In the
1789 and 1792 reports, the child testified unsworn and Leach’s
made no mention of the mother, lodger, or any hearsay. The
1800 report changed the trial court and judge. More important,
while the body of the report remained similar to the prior 1789
and 1792 reports and stated that the child testified unsworn, a
footnote was added indicating that additional information about
the case was located in manuscript notes:114 “It appears by a
by the Court, to possess a sufficient knowledge of the nature and
consequences of an oath [reporter’s footnote]: for there is no
precise or fixed rule as to the time within which infants are
excluded from giving evidence; but their admissibility depends
upon the sense and reason they entertain of the danger and
impiety of falsehood, which is to be collected from their answers
to questions propounded to them by the Court; but if they are
found incompetent to take an oath, their testimony cannot be
received. They determined, therefore, that the information of
the infant, which had been given in evidence in the present case,
ought not to have been received.
[first footnote]: It appears by a manuscript note of this case, in
the possession of a gentleman at the bar, that the child’s
evidence was not received at all; but that the mother and another
witness gave evidence of what the child had said at the time.
[second footnote]: See White’s Case, post.
Brasier, 1 Leach 237 (K.B. rev. ed. 1800).
112
Brasier, 1 Leach 346 (K.B. 1789 ed.).
113
Brasier, 1 Leach 182-83 (K.B. rev. ed. 1792); Brasier, 1 Leach 237
(K.B. rev. ed. 1800).
114
For a discussion of how manuscript notes kept by lawyers, judges, or
others may differ from case reports, see generally James Oldham, Detecting
Non-Fiction: Sleuthing Among Manuscript Case Reports for What was Really
Said in LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN (1995) (noting discrepancies between
printed reports and manuscript notes kept by judges, lawyers, and others and
analyzing five cases to show how manuscripts can alter the understanding of
printed case reports).
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manuscript note of this case, in the possession of a gentleman at
the bar, that the child’s evidence was not received at all; but that
the mother and another witness gave evidence of what the child
had said at the time.”115 Finally, the 1815 report stated in the
body of the report both that Mary Harris did not testify and that
hearsay of the mother and lodger was received at trial.
These multiple versions and changes over time are important
from an original meaning context because, assuming the
Framers even referred to the law of child competency when
considering confrontation rights, the only Leach’s reports of
Brasier in print at the framing in 1789 and ratification in 1791
did not mention hearsay. Nor did the Leach’s reports in print the
year after ratification in 1792.116 Simply put, before, during, and
immediately after 1791, the Framers likely would have
understood Brasier as concerning only child competency and not
the admission of out-of-court statements.
What about the hearsay testimony of the mother and the
lodger? Again, the reports of the case in Leach’s until 1800
made no mention of hearsay. I did locate, however, some postBrasier/pre-ratification English sources that suggest generally,
with no mention of the mother and lodger, that Brasier involved
hearsay. The 1783 English edition Commentaries of William
Blackstone (one of the Twelve Judges who considered Brasier),
for instance, provided: “[I]t is now settled [Brazier’s case,
before the twelve judges, P. 19 Geo. III] that no hearsay
evidence can be given of the declarations of a child who hath
not capacity to be sworn, nor can such child be examined in
court without oath . . . .”117 But Blackstone’s discussion of
Brasier does not appear to have been widely considered even in
115

Brasier, 1 Leach 237 (K.B. rev. ed. 1800).
Some framing-era reports of Brasier suggest an understanding that
Mary Harris testified, but even some of those reports reflect an inconsistent
understanding of the case. An annotation accompanying the Travers case, for
instance, suggests that Mary Harris was sworn: “Brazier’s case, where an
infant of 5 years old was held a good witness by all the Judges, she appearing
to be acquainted with the nature of the obligation of the oath.” Rex v.
Travers, 93 Eng. Rep. 793, 794, 2 Strange 700, 701 (K.B. 1726).
117
See Blackstone, supra note 60 (1783 English edition).
116
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England before 1791. For example, Burn’s 1785 justice of the
peace manual appears to reference Brasier (not by name), but
made no mention of hearsay.118 Similarly, Barry’s English
justice of the peace manual from 1790 discusses Brasier,
indicates that Mary Harris testified at trial unsworn, and does
not mention hearsay.119 After 1791, however, the 1793 update of
Burn’s justice of the peace manual summarizes Blackstone’s
discussion of Brasier and hearsay, but it is questionable whether
that or any post-1785 version of Burns would have been
available in the states.120 Further, a 1793 English treatise also

118

4 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 69 (15th ed. 1785).
Burn’s manual notes Hale’s argument for allowing unsworn testimony and
Hale’s rationale that “the law allows what the child told her mother or other
relations to be given in evidence . . . and there is much more reason for the
court to hear the narration of the child herself, than to receive it second hand
from those who swear they heard her say so.” Id. (citation omitted). The
manual discusses Blackstone’s view on the age of incompetency (from the
edition of Blackstone before Brasier was added) and makes what likely is a
reference to Brasier: “But after all, it is said to have been determined lately
by all the judges upon conference, that in no case shall the testimony of an
infant be admitted without oath.” Id. at 71. Later editions replace this
reference with a more detailed account of Brasier. See discussion infra note
120.
119
3 EDWARD BARRY, THE PRESENT PRACTICE OF A JUSTICE OF THE
PEACE 521 (1790). Barry’s description appears to be based in part on Richard
Burn’s 1785 (15th edition) manual, though it adds a more detailed discussion
of Brasier. See discussion supra note 118. I was unable to locate a copy of
the 16th edition of Burn’s published in 1788, which may include the same
text as Barry.
120
The 1793 update to Burn’s justice of the peace manual, supra note
118, deleted the following passage from a prior edition which appeared to
reference Brasier: “But after all, it is said to have been determined lately by
all the judges upon conference, that in no case shall the testimony of an
infant be admitted without oath.” The 1793 edition replaced this passage with
the following, which cited to Blackstone as the source: “Finally, It is now
settled by all the twelve judges upon conference, in Brazier’s case, E. 19. G.
3, that no hearsay evidence can be given of the declarations of a child who
hath not capacity to be sworn, nor can such child be examined in court
without oath . . . .” JOHN BURN, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE (18th ed. 1793)
(revised edition of works of Richard Burns, his father).
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discussed Brasier but made no mention of hearsay.121 All of this
suggests that Brasier was not widely considered as involving
hearsay in England before or shortly after 1791.
Even assuming Blackstone’s short reference to Brasier was a
reliable indicator of framing-era understanding in England
before ratification, however, it does not show that child hearsay
was considered “testimonial.” Blackstone merely recognized,
without any discussion of the facts in the case, that (1) a child
could not testify unsworn; and (2) no hearsay of an unsworn
child could be received in evidence. Blackstone did not say
hearsay is “testimony.” Also, the principal rationale for
excluding unsworn testimony, or second-hand accounts of
unsworn hearsay, was a concern that an incompetent child may
not understand right from wrong.122 That says nothing about
cross-examination and is more akin to a reliability concern, a
consideration the Crawford court rejected in confrontation
analysis.123
In sum, the law in England before Brasier allowed out-ofcourt statements of children to be admitted into evidence and
that law was the predicate for an ongoing debate over child
competency issues, including the age at which children should
be sworn and whether children should be permitted to testify
unsworn. Brasier was understood in England as resolving the
121

A 1793 treatise I located simply reported the 1789 Leach’s version of
Brasier (which makes no mention of the mother and lodger) as addressing the
age at which a child could be sworn and prohibition on unsworn testimony.
PETER LOVELASS, THE TRADER’S SAFEGUARD: A FULL, CLEAR, AND
FAMILIAR EXPLANATION OF THE LAW 276 (1793). As for Blackstone, it is
questionable whether Blackstone’s reference to Brasier and hearsay would
have influenced the Framers, since most of the editions of Blackstone in the
states did not contain it and it is doubtful the other sources discussing
Blackstone would have been widely available, or available at all in the states
before 1791. See discussion supra note 60 (discussing use of Blackstone’s
Commentaries in the colonies).
122
See Rex v. Travers, 93 Eng. Rep. 793, 2 Strange 700 (K.B. 1726)
(“The reason why the law prohibits the evidence of a child so young is,
because the child cannot be presumed to distinguish betwixt right and
wrong”); see also supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
123
See discussion supra note 5.
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age of capacity and unsworn testimony issue. As for the issue
concerning out-of-court statements, there does not appear to be a
general understanding in England in 1791 that Brasier changed
the rule concerning whether hearsay was admissible, in large
part because most reports of the case of the time do not even
mention hearsay. To the extent the hearsay in Brasier was
known at the time, moreover, none of the analysis focused on
confrontation, hearsay, or cross-examination. Indeed, if the child
in Brasier did in fact testify unsworn, as the 1789 and 1792
reports in Leach’s suggest, there likely would be no
confrontation issue at all. When a witness appears, testifies, and
the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine, the only
constraint is hearsay principles, not the Confrontation Clause.124
D. How Brasier was Understood In the Years After It Was
Decided
In Crawford, the majority looked not only to the law leading
up to ratification to determine the original meaning of the
Confrontation Clause, but also “[e]arly state decisions [that]
shed light upon the original understanding of the common-law
right” as well as nineteenth century treatises.125 Conducting a
post-ratification analysis of how Brasier was understood in
England or the states reveals that much depends on which report
of the case was being reviewed. Further complicating matters,
one of the most often cited reports of Brasier was not the 1789,
1792, 1800, or 1815 reports in Leach’s or the short reference in
Blackstone’s Commentaries, but rather, a report of the case that
appeared in a popular treatise from 1803.
1. Brasier and Child Competency Issues
Regardless of the report of Brasier at issue, both before and
124

E.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“[W]e
reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior
testimonial statements”).
125
Id. at 49.
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after 1791 the case principally was understood in England and
the states as resolving child competency issues. Two of the first
treatise references to Brasier discussed the case in terms of child
competency. As noted, in 1783 Blackstone, one of the Twelve
Judges who considered Brasier, referenced the case as resolving
issues concerning the age at which a child could be sworn,
rejecting Hale’s view that children should be permitted to testify
unsworn, and precluding the admission of hearsay of an
incompetent child.126 Blackstone, however, did not mention the
mother or the lodger and did not expressly state whether Mary
Harris had been permitted to testify unsworn.127 Likewise, Sir
Francis Buller’s treatise was revised in 1790 to incorporate
Brasier into its discussion of child competency issues.128 Citing
the 1789 Leach’s report of Brasier, Buller describes the case as
holding, “that a child of any age if she were capable of
distinguishing between good and evil might be examined on
oath, and consequently, that evidence of what she had said ought
not to be received.”129 This description is notable not only
because it makes no mention of the mother or lodger and any
hearsay, but also because Buller (according to the 1800 and
1815 reports) was the trial judge in Brasier who referred the
case to the Twelve Judges (which also included Buller) for
review.
Early state cases similarly cited Brasier for child competency
issues. Courts cited the case to support no presumptive limit on
the age at which a child could be sworn,130 a result ultimately
126

See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
128
See supra note 63 and accompanying text (quoting earlier edition of
Buller treatise).
129
FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO
TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS 293 (London, A. Strahan & M. Woodfall Law Printers
to the King, corrected 5th ed. 1790).
130
E.g., State v. True Whittier, 21 Me. 341, 347 (1842) (“It was at one
time considered, that an infant, under the age of nine years could not be
permitted to testify. Rex v. Travers, Stra. 700. And that between the ages of
nine and fourteen years it was within the discretion of the Court to admit or
not, as it should or should not be satisfied of the infant’s understanding and
moral sense. It was finally determined in Brazier’s case, [citing East’s 1803
127
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followed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1895 when it adopted
Brasier and upheld a trial court’s decision finding a five-year-old
competent to testify in a murder case.131 Courts also cited
Brasier as resolving the issue about whether children could
testify unsworn, such as in an 1814 Delaware case, which
contrasted Hale’s view on allowing a child to testify unsworn
with Brasier.132 Similarly, the Alabama Supreme Court in 1841,
citing the 1789 Leach’s report of Brasier noted that, “In Lord
Hale’s time, it was common to examine children of tender
years, without swearing them. This practice was overturned in
1779, in Brazier’s case, when the judges were unanimously of
the opinion that no testimony whatever, could be legally
report], on consideration between all the judges that a child of any age,
capable of distinguishing between good and evil, might be examined under
oath.” (citations omitted)); Day v. Day, 56 N.H. 316 (1876) (citing 1800
Leach’s report of Brasier and East’s 1803 report for proposition that children
under age nine may be competent to give testimony if they understand the
nature of the oath); McGuff v. State, 7 So. 35, 37 (Ala. 1889) (“This court
has accordingly followed, in substance, the rule laid down in Brasier’s case,
[citing 1815 report and East’s 1803 report], where it was held that there was
‘no precise or fixed rule as to the time within which infants are excluded
from giving evidence . . . .’’’); Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523
(1895) (citing 1815 Leach’s report for its holding that there was no fixed age
to give oath and finding no error in court finding five-year-old competent to
testify in murder case); accord Piepke v. Philadelphia, 89 A. 124, 126 (Pa.
1913) (“The modern law and practice follow Brasier’s case, 1 Leach’s Crown
Law, 199 [1815 report], decided more than 100 years ago, where it was
distinctly held for the first time, by an undivided court, that, where there is
no precise or fixed rule as to the time within which infants are excluded from
giving evidence . . . .”); State v. Southmayd, 158 N.W. 404, 404-05 (S.D.
1916) (quoting Wheeler’s discussion of Brasier and finding no abuse of
discretion in allowing six-year-old witness to testify in murder case);
Leahman v. Broughton, 244 S.W. 403, 404 (Ky. Ct. App. 1922) (citing
East’s 1803 report of Brasier in support of allowing child of any age to be
sworn and finding court erred in refusing eight-year-old girl the opportunity
to testify).
131
Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 525.
132
State v. Miller, 1 Del. Cas. 512, 512 (Del. 1814) (“In this case a
child about nine years old, who knew not the nature or obligation of an oath,
was not admitted to testify. For, 1 Hale P.C. 634 (examined by court without
oath); contra, Brazier’s Case, Bull N.P. 293 . . . .”).
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received, except when given on oath.”133
2. Brasier and Hearsay
In the hundred years following framing and ratification of
the Sixth Amendment, treatises and courts employed various
interpretations of Brasier’s exclusion of the mother and lodger’s
hearsay. As noted, there was confusion in the eighteenth century
about whether Brasier involved hearsay. Leach’s 1789 and 1792
reports of Brasier made no mention of the out-of-court
statements (or the mother and lodger), though Blackstone in
1783 made a general reference to hearsay. By 1800, Leach’s
report began to mention hearsay (first in a footnote) and
Blackstone’s report was appearing in other treatises, but the
association of Brasier and hearsay appears not to have taken
hold in England until 1803 when a new report of the case
appeared in Edward Hyde East’s, A Treatise of the Pleas of the
Crown.134 Citing the manuscript notes of Buller and Gould of
the Twelve Judges (and the “amended” 1800 edition of Leach’s
which contained the footnote mentioning the mother and lodger),
133

State v. Morea, 2 Ala. 275 (1841) (citing the 1789 version of
Brasier). By 1901, however, confrontation rhetoric began finding its way into
the oath issues. In State v. Lugar, 88 N.W. 333 (Iowa 1901), the defendant
was charged with prostitution and a witness who inadvertently was not sworn
gave “damaging” testimony against her. The court found that the admission
of unsworn testimony was reversible error, citing the 1789 version of
Brasier as a case reflecting that no unsworn testimony can be admitted. The
decision, however, tied the oath issue to confrontation:
The constitution of this state guaranties to every man accused of a
crime the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him,
and this would be but a barren right, and afford the defendant
no protection, if such witness may testify without being sworn,
or without any way being subject to the penalties of perjury.
Id. at 334.
134
1 EDWARD HYDE EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 443-44 (London
1803). The first American edition was published in 1806. 1 EDWARD HYDE
EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 443-44 (Philadelphia, P Byren, Law Bookseller
1806). Thanks to Robert Kry for providing me the London edition and for his
helpful thoughts on East and other sections of this article.
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East set forth another version of Brasier, this one adding new
details about the trial and review by the Twelve Judges not
present in any of the prior reports. Because of its importance,
East’s discussion is set forth in full:
The last case which has occurred on this doubtful
subject is that of William Brazier, who was tried for
assaulting Mary Harris, an infant of five years old,
with intent to ravish her. The case on the part of the
prosecution was proved by the mother of the child
and another woman who lodged with her, to whom
the child immediately on her coming home told all
the circumstances of the injury done to her, and
described the prisoner, who was a soldier, as the
person who had committed it; but she did not know
his name.
The next day the prisoner was called from the guard
by the serjeant, and shewn to the child, who
immediately said that was the man. Two other
soldiers had been before shewn to her, of whom she
at once denied any knowledge. There was no fact or
circumstance to confirm the account given by the girl
that the prisoner was the man who committed the
offense, except that he lodged where she described.
That she had received some hurt was proved by a
surgeon as well as by the two women. The child was
coming from school when the prisoner attacked her.
The school did not break up till four o’clock, and she
was at home before five, and had no conversation or
communication with the mother before she had told
all that had passed. The prisoner was convicted.
But Mr. Justice Buller reserved the above statement
of facts for the opinion of the judges, whether this
evidence ought to have been received, or was
sufficient in point of law to be left to the jury. On the
first day of Easter term 1779 the judges met on this
subject, when all of them except Gould and Willes,
Js. held that this evidence of the information of the
child ought not to have been received, as she herself
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was not heard on oath; as to which some, particularly
Blackstone, Nares, Eyre and Buller Js. thought that if
she appeared on examination to have been capable of
distinguishing between good and evil, she might have
been sworn. But as to that, others, particularly Gould
and Willes Js. held that the presumption of law of
want of discretion under the age of seven is
conclusive; so as not to admit an infant under that age
to be sworn on any examination as to her capacity.
And as the information or narration from the child,
Gould and Willes Js. held that it being recently after
the fact, so that it excluded a possibility of practicing
on her, it was a part of the fact or transaction itself,
and therefore admissible: and Buller J., held the
same, if by law the child could not be examined on
oath. But as to what happened the next day, Gould J.,
thought it not admissible, by reason of the danger of
her being influenced in the interval.
But on the 29th [of] April all the judges being
assembled, they unanimously agreed that a child of
any age, if she were capable of distinguishing
between good and evil, might be examined on oath;
and consequently that evidence of what she had said
ought not to have been received. And that a child of
whatever age cannot be examined unless sworn. The
prisoner was pardoned.
It does not however appear to have been denied by
any in the above case, that the fact of the child’s
having complained of the injury recently after it was
received is confirmatory evidence.135
The East treatment of Brasier, therefore, departs
significantly from the 1789 and 1792 reports in Leach’s. It cites
the 1800 edition of Leach’s, which included a footnote
mentioning a “manuscript note” of the case, suggesting that the
mother and another witness provided hearsay. (The manuscript
135

1 EAST, supra note 134, at 443-44.
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might be the notes of Buller and Gould cited by East). East is
ambiguous on whether Mary Harris testified unsworn, yet
reflects that the Twelve Judges were addressing both the age at
which a child could be sworn and Hale’s argument that a child
could testify unsworn. By italicizing the reference to the mother
and the lodger, East may have been attempting to acknowledge
that other reports did not mention them, and the emphasis was
meant to put the issue to rest. Finally, East’s report appears to
suggest an exception to barring admission of hearsay statements
of unsworn children: evidence that the child had complained
shortly after the rape, but not the details of the offense, might be
admissible as “confirmatory evidence.”136
The East report of Brasier became one of the most cited
accounts of the case and resulted in Brasier being interpreted in
nineteenth century treatises and cases for various propositions
concerning hearsay law. For instance, the 1816 edition of
Phillipps’s Law of Evidence cited East’s report of Brasier in its
discussion of res gestae, noting that “on an indictment for rape,
what the girl said recently after the fact (so that it excluded a
possibility of practicing on her), has been held to be admissible
in evidence, as part of the transaction.”137 Similarly, as various
136

Id. at 444.
S.M. PHILLIPPS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 202 (John A.
Dunlap ed., New York, Gould, Banks & Gould 1816). The 1838 edition of
the treatise cites the East and 1815 reports of Brasier in the section
concerning the law of competency:
A more reasonable rule has since been adopted, and the
competency of children is now regulated, not by their age, but
by the degree of understanding which they appear to possess. In
Brazier’s case, on an indictment for assaulting an infant five
years old with the intent to ravish her, all the judges agreed, that
children of any age might be examined upon oath, if they were
capable of distinguishing between good and evil, and possessed
of sufficient knowledge of the nature and consequences of an
oath, but that they could not in any case be examined without
oath. This is now the established rule, as well in criminal, as in
civil cases, and it applies equally to capital offences as to
offences of inferior nature.
S. MARCH PHILLIPPS & ANDREW AMOS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
137
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state-amici in Davis noted,138 the 1824 edition of Thomas
Starkie’s influential treatise, A Practical Treatise on the Law of
Evidence,139 cited Brasier for the proposition that, “where an
immediate account is given, or complaint made, by an
individual, of a personal injury committed against him, the fact
of making the complaint immediately, and before it is likely that
anything should have been contrived and devised for the private
advantage of the party, is admissible in evidence; as upon an
indictment for rape . . . .”140
Cases from the late nineteenth century likewise cited East’s
report of Brasier in terms of res gestae. Some courts permitted
admission of testimony that the child had reported the offense
soon after it occurred, but did not allow hearsay concerning the
details of the crime;141 other courts more liberally allowed
EVIDENCE 5 (8th ed., London, Saunders and Benning, Law Booksellers
1838).
138
See Brief for the States of Ill. et al., supra note 10, at *7-8.
139
1 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 149 (1st ed. 1824).
140
Id.
141
In State v. Ivins, 36 N.J.L. 233 (N.J. 1873), the defendant was tried
for attempt to ravish an adult woman and the trial court permitted the
admission of hearsay concerning both the fact that the complaint was made
immediately after the occurrence and the particulars of the defendant’s
alleged conduct. The court found that “the rule that in trials for rape, the fact
that the woman alleged to have been violated, made complaint soon after the
occurrence, is admissible as evidence on the part of the prosecution, is
entirely settled, and is very familiar in practice. To this extent, hearsay
evidence becomes admissible, and this departure from the ordinary rule
seems justifiable on the ground, that in the natural course of things, if a
woman has thus been foully wronged, she will almost necessarily disclose the
fact.” Id. The court addressed whether this exception in rape cases should
apply in attempts to commit a rape. “There does not appear to be much
authority upon the subject, but the little that there is, favors the admissibility
of the evidence. Brazier’s Case, reported in 1 East P.C. 443, tends evidently
to this result . . . .” Id. at 234. The court applied the same rule for rape and
attempted rape cases. Notably, with regard to whether hearsay of the
victim’s details of the offense were admissible, the court held that “[i]t is
every day’s practice to exclude such narrations in trials for rape.” Id. at 235.
Similarly, in Hornbeck v. State, 35 Ohio St. 277 (1879), the defendant was
charged with intent to commit a rape and the alleged child victim was found
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hearsay concerning the details of the offense.142
incompetent to testify. The trial court admitted hearsay evidence concerning
what the child had said about the rape and the defendant was convicted. On
appeal, the court noted the rule that “where the prosecutrix in a case of this
nature has been examined as a witness, the declarations made by her
immediately after the offense was committed, may be given in evidence, in
the first instance, to corroborate her testimony.” Id. at 279. But since the
child had not testified, the court had to consider the admission of the hearsay.
In so doing, the court noted Lord Hale’s view that children should be allowed
to testify unsworn and cited East’s report of Brasier as rejecting that rule. Id.
The court also cited cases holding that “in cases of violence to the person,
except when made in extremis, the declaration of the injured party are
hearsay, and, therefore, inadmissible to prove the offense; and the fact that
the declarent is incapable of taking an oath, by reason of imbecility, insanity,
or infancy, will not justify a departure from the long and firmly-established
rule of evidence on the subject.” Id. at 280. The conviction was reversed
and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 281; see also Lyles v. United States, 20
App. D.C. 559, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1902) (“It seems to be settled that the fact
that the prosecuting witness made complaint recently after the commission of
the alleged crime is admissible generally, and as evidence in chief.” (citing
East’s version of Brasier)).
142
In Kenney v. State, 79 S.W. 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903), the
defendant was charged with the rape of a three-year-old. At trial, the child
was deemed incompetent and the child’s mother was permitted to testify that
the child told her the defendant had committed the offense. The court found
that:
For aught that appears, the assault complained of had just been
committed, and the child released by appellant, when she
appeared before her mother and made said declarations. So that,
so far as the time is concerned, while it was not exactly
contemporaneous with the main fact (i.e., the outrage), yet it
was so proximate to that event, and at least the first portion of
the declaration apparently so spontaneous, as to make it come
within the rule of res gestae, as laid down by this court.
Id. at 818. The court recognized that by not requiring a contemporaneous
declaration it was departing from the common law, but nonetheless found the
hearsay statements res gestae. The court also addressed the appellant’s
argument that, since the child was incapable of giving sworn testimony,
hearsay of what an incompetent witness said likewise should not be received.
The court held, however, that “wherever the testimony of an infant is a part
of the res gestae, it is introduceable, notwithstanding the fact that the witness
was incompetent to take an oath.” Id. The court distinguished common law
cases following a different rule on the ground that they did not involve res
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Other courts and commentators of the period cited Brasier
for a more limited proposition. St. George Tucker’s 1803
American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries (based on the
1783 English edition) arguably suggested that the case simply
meant that if a child lacked the capacity to be sworn, the
statements the child told others likewise could not be
received.143 Phillipps’s treatise took a similar view: “When a
child from defect of understanding or instruction is unfit to be
sworn, it follows as a necessary consequence, that any account,
which it may have given to others, of the transaction, ought not
to be admitted.”144 There were also cases to the same effect.145
gestae. It referenced East’s version of Brasier in support of admitting
hearsay of those unsworn as res gestae: “it had been considered, allowable
on an indictment for an assault on an infant five years old with intent to
ravish her, to give evidence of the child having complained of the injury
recently thereafter . . . .” Id. at 819. The conviction was affirmed. A
dissenting opinion argued that the majority’s decision was not sound and the
law was clear that “the statement of an incompetent witness, a child, made
immediately after the occurrence [is] inadmissible.” Id. at 820 (Davidson,
P.J., dissenting). The dissent claimed this was the rule at common law, citing
East’s report of Brasier and the Travers case. The judge quoted nearly the
entire section of East describing Brasier and concluded that “at common law
[there was] the unqualified rule rejecting this character of testimony.” Id. at
822.
143
See 5 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 214.
144
PHILLIPPS, supra note 137, at 6 (1838 ed.).
145
See Oregon v. Tom, A Chinaman, 8 Or. 177, 180 (1879) (“The rule
that the declarations of one incompetent to testify cannot be admitted in
evidence, is now the established doctrine in the States of the Union . . . .”
(discussing Blackstone’s reference to Brasier)). In Weldon v. State, 32 Ind.
81 (1869), the court held that it was error to admit declarations of an
incompetent child to prove charges of assault and battery with intent to
commit a rape. The court noted that Hale argued to allow children to testify
unsworn and that parents were permitted to testify about the child’s account
of the rape, but that these ideas had been rejected:
That being the true rule in case of a person immature in
intellect, I cannot see why the reason of the rule does not apply
with as much force to exclude all evidence of the declarations,
assertions, or signs made . . . by a person who is incompetent to
be sworn as a witness.
Id. at 83. Notably, Weldon quotes another case for the following: “At the

6/22/2007 1:09 AM

FRANZE

544

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Still, some treatises and cases interpreted Brasier’s exclusion
of hearsay on best evidence/necessity-type grounds. In other
words, the mother and lodger’s testimony was excluded
principally because the court had not first attempted to see
whether the secondary evidence was needed when it failed to
assess Mary Harris’s capacity to take the oath. In 1827, for
instance, Jeremy Bentham, citing the 1800 Leach’s report of
Brasier, suggested that the hearsay of the mother and lodger was
excluded because the trial judge had not tried to determine
whether the child was competent to testify:
[T]wo conditions precedent have been annexed. One
is, that the child shall have taken oath; i.e. gone
through the same ceremony by which testimonial
relation is preceded in other instance. To this
operation, had it been performed [in Brasier], there
could have been no objection.146
Though much later in time, a court in 1911 interpreted
Brasier in a similar way:
As far back as Brazier’s Case, 1 East P.C. 443, it
seems to have been virtually allowed that in such
cases proof of the complaint and its details might be
received, though in that instance it was held improper
because the child was not shown incompetent to
testify; which in effect was saying . . . that a rule of
evidence dictated by necessity becomes inapplicable
wherever that necessity does not exist.147
time of Brazier’s Case, it seems to have been considered, that, as the child
was incompetent to take an oath, what she said was receivable in evidence.
The law was not so well settled then as it is now.” Id. (quoting Regina v.
Guttridges, 9 C. & P. 471).
146
5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 149 (1827).
Because the treatise relied on the 1800 report of the case, it appears to
assume the child in Brasier testified. See id. (“For, with the approbation of
the twelve judges, in the case of an infant of no more than seven years old
[citing 1800 report of Brasier and another case] (how much under is not
said), this evidence was received.”).
147
Commonwealth v. Zypa, 3 Berks 350 (Pa. O & T 1911), available at
1911 WL 3681. In Zypa, the defendant was charged with raping a seven-
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Finally, some courts interpreted Brasier as involving the
right to submit hearsay corroborating a witness’s testimony. In
1850, the Supreme Court included East’s report of Brasier in a
string cite in support of the proposition that where a witness is
impeached with a prior inconsistent statement, evidence that the
witness previously gave a consistent statement is inadmissible.148
year-old girl, the child was deemed incompetent, and the court permitted the
girl’s mother to recount statements the girl had made about the alleged rape.
The court addressed the issue of whether “it was proper to receive and
submit to the jury evidence of what the child had said concerning the injury
done her as proof of defendant’s guilt.” Id. at *1. The court discussed several
relevant legal principles. First, the court noted the rule allowing hearsay
testimony of the act that the complaint of the rape was made, but excluding
the substance of the details of the offense. Id. Second, the court noted the
rule that where the witness had testified and the testimony attacked, courts
allowed the admission of hearsay to corroborate the testimony. Id. at *2-3.
Third, the court found that where the witness was unavailable because of lack
of competence because of young age, “necessity” might permit such
testimony since otherwise perpetrators would benefit simply because of the
nature of the crime and age of their victims. Id. at *4. The court found that
(East’s report of) Brasier supported admission of such statements, even
though the statements there were excluded because the court failed to
determine if the child was competent:
As far back as Brazier’s Case, 1 East P.C. 443, it seems to have
been virtually allowed that in such cases proof of the complaint
and its details might be received, though in that instance it was
held improper because the child was not shown incompetent to
testify; which in effect was but saying . . . that a rule of
evidence dictated by necessity becomes inapplicable wherever
that necessity does not exist.
Id. at 5. Fourth, the court noted cases considering hearsay statements made
spontaneously after events might be admitted as res gestae. Id. at 6. The
court ultimately held that hearsay of a rape victim may be received in
connection with other evidence that tended to show a rape was committed and
that the accused was in a position to commit it. Id. at 7. Though finding no
error in the admission of the testimony, the court vacated the conviction on
the ground that hearsay tending to exculpate the defendant was not admitted
and, because it too was res gestae, it should have been admitted to give the
jury a full picture of the situation. Id. at 7-8. Beyond that, other
circumstances, including the unpreparedness of the defendant’s lawyer and
the incompetency of an interpreter warranted a retrial. Id.
148
Conrad v. Griffey, 52 U.S. 480, 490-91 (1850) (“But in other places,
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This may suggest that the Supreme Court understood that
Brasier involved the child testifying and the exclusion of the
testimony of the mother and lodger was based on the testimony’s
status as improper prior consistent statements of the child.
Thus, post-ratification interpretation of Brasier in England
and the states on hearsay is as diverse as it is irrelevant to the
understanding of the case in 1791, given that most
interpretations of the case were based on East’s 1803 modified
report or on the altered 1815 Leach’s report that appeared more
than a decade after ratification of the Confrontation Clause.
II. LESSONS FROM BRASIER?
Putting aside my interpretation of Brasier, the case serves as
an apt case study on the practical issues of a criminal procedure
framework that requires overworked prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and judges to determine the “Framers’ design” to
resolve what statements are, and are not, “testimonial” under
the Confrontation Clause.
The most striking example of the practical problem with
determining authentic original meaning is that all participants in
Davis failed to note that the reports of Brasier in print at
ratification,149 wherein the child reportedly testified, effectively
takes the case out of the realm of confrontation analysis. That
the entire debate is based on the potentially flawed premise that
the child did not appear at trial is telling. It illustrates that
research into historic sources is essentially a specialty, foreign to
as in England, such evidence, though at one time considered competent, and
especially in criminal cases, is now even there excluded.” (citing, among
others, Brazier’s Case, 1 East P.C. 444) (citations omitted)); see also Head
v. State, 44 Miss. 731, 751 (1870) (“For the purpose of discrediting a
witness, it is competent to prove that he made discordant statements, at other
times and places, but to reestablish creditability, or to support what he has
deposed on the trial, it is inadmissible to prove that he has made substantially
the same statements, to a third person. Many years ago the British courts
received such testimony; afterwards its propriety was doubted, and finally
repudiated. The weight of authority and reason is against it.” (citing, among
other cases, East’s version of Brasier)).
149
See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
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most in practice, and it counsels against lending too much
weight to sources that, in many respects, may have the
reliability of a modern day Internet blog.150 Though legal
historians might know to look for earlier editions or manuscripts
of reported cases, and may be able to explain how and why
changes such as those in Brasier occurred over time, criminal
lawyers in the trenches—and the judges deciding these issues—
cannot reasonably be expected to have the time to find, much
less trace the origins of, each and every common law case that
seems significant to the confrontation issue before them.
Indeed, many common law sources are not readily
accessible. Simply tracking down the multiple reports of Brasier
and determining which versions were available from 1789 to
1791 required consultation with a legal history scholar and
assistance from my law firm’s London office library as well as a
law school library where I have research privileges.151 It
required sources from specialized subscription databases and
obtaining materials (unavailable on-line) from the rare book
collections of libraries and historical societies.
Brasier also illustrates another practical issue with a rigid
originalism-based legal framework: determining the date at
which to view the “Framers’ understanding.” As noted, to make
this determination the Supreme Court often looks at 1791, the
year that the Bill of Rights was ratified.152 Others have
persuasively argued that “the original meaning has to refer to
the public meaning of the text at the time the First Congress
approved the language of the amendments—the date the text was
framed.”153 Under this approach, September 25, 1789, the date
when the text of the Bill of Rights including the Confrontation
Clause was approved by the First Congress, becomes the
150

See Davies, Not the Framers’ Design, supra note 26, at 390 n.96
(“Relying upon post-framing editions of treatises that were initially published
prior to the framing can result in serious errors because new material was
sometimes added, or alterations were sometimes made, to the pre-framing
text”).
151
See supra author’s footnote.
152
See supra note 18.
153
Davies, What Did the Framers Know, supra note 26, at 158.
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relevant date.154 After the cutoff date is determined, moreover,
there is debate about how long before or after that date treatise
and case discussions reliably reflect the Framers’ understanding
of the law.155
These timing issues have practical significance, again
illustrated by Brasier. The first report in Brasier that appeared
in Leach’s Crown Cases became available in London no earlier
than May 1789.156 Accordingly, given the communication
difficulties of the era, it is unlikely that the original report of
Brasier (even if it had been the same as the 1815 report) would
have reached the First Congress in Philadelphia before
September.157 Unaware of Brasier, the Framers likely would
have understood the law as set forth in Sir Matthew Hale’s
treatise and as restated in English and early American editions of
Blackstone’s Commentaries that flooded the states and that
154

See id. at 159.
Compare Davies, What Did the Framers Know, supra note 26, at
179-80 (arguing that state cases decided more than a few decades after the
framing are invalid evidence of original meaning) with Kry, supra note 26, at
47 (disagreeing with Professor Davies concerning whether post-ratification
sources are valid evidence of original meaning). Mr. Kry, for instance, takes
issue with Professor Davies’s argument that the Radbourne, Woodcock, and
Dingler decisions from post-1787 “are not valid evidence of original meaning
because the reports would not have been widely available in the United States
when the Sixth Amendment was framed.” Kry, supra note 26, at 522 (citing
Davies, What Did the Framers Know, supra note 26, at 153-62). Kry
responds that “[b]ecause colonial lawyers were directly exposed to English
practices and ideas, English evidence is relevant whether or not it appeared in
a published treatise or case report shipped to the colonies,” particularly
where a case in question merely embodied preexisting English law. Id.
(“Radbourne, Woodcock, and Dingler do not purport to change Marian
committal procedure in any way they simply confirm what that procedure
already was”). Davies, in turn, replies that “Hening made no mention in
1794 of Radbourne or Woodcock, five years after the reports of those cases
were initially published in Leach’s reports of Old Bailey cases (Dingler still
had not been published).” Davies, Revisiting Fictional Originalism, supra
note 26, at 620. The timing debates are particularly relevant in Brasier,
which reflected a change in law. Whether the Framers were aware of the
case as opposed to the law reported by Hale and Blackstone is significant.
156
See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
157
See Davies, What Did the Framers Know, supra note 26, at 109-12.
155
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followed Hale’s view that “the law allows what the child told
her mother, or other relations, to be given in evidence.”158 As
the Supreme Court recognized fifty years ago, “two of the
greatest English jurists, Lord Chief Justice Hale and Sir William
Blackstone . . . exerted considerable influence on the
Founders . . . .”159 Indeed, colonial justice of the peace
manuals, which “were probably the sources regarding criminal
procedure that were most accessible to members of the Framers’
generation,”160 arguably reflected some debate over whether
children in sexual abuse cases could testify unsworn, but made
no mention of Brasier or otherwise questioned Hale’s
recognition that the law allowed child hearsay in sexual abuse
cases.161 On the other hand, there was some reference to Brasier
and hearsay in later editions of Blackstone,162 so one cannot
foreclose some knowledge of the case in America beyond
Leach’s reports. But even the post-Brasier English sources
158

See supra note 60 and accompanying text. The defendants in Davis
acknowledged that before Brasier courts often admitted hearsay testimony of
children in rape cases, but reasonably concluded that Brasier changed the
rules. See discussion supra note 35 and accompanying test. To be sure, there
was a notable absence in Old Bailey reports after Brasier where hearsay was
admitted in rape cases. On the other hand, this may not reflect any change in
practice of the time, but rather, how cases were reported. “After about 1790,
most reports of such cases in the Old Bailey Proceedings give no details of
the offense, and often do not give even the name of the victim. It is likely
that many cases after this date represented instances of child molestation.”
Simpson, supra note 49, at 191-92. Further, in the years following Brasier,
courts bent over backwards to find young children competent to testify, going
so far as to defer trials while children deemed incompetent received
instruction on the nature and consequences of taking the oath. See
Commonwealth v. Lynes, 8 N.E. 408 (Mass. 1886). In short, even if Brasier
did change the rules in England, it is questionable whether that was generally
understood in 1791 in England, much less the states.
159
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 26 (1957).
160
Thomas Davies, The Fictional Character of Law and Order
Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era
Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239,
280 (2002).
161
See discussion supra notes 98, 118-20.
162
See discussion supra notes 117, 120.
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before and immediately after ratification were inconsistent on the
discussion of Brasier, with some citing only to the report of the
case where Mary Harris testified and others noting Blackstone’s
generalized reference to hearsay. Conflicting sources and
multiple editions of case reporters and treatises, therefore,
require the virtually impossible determination of what sources
the Framers would and would not have considered, something
particularly difficult where, as with Brasier, the case would have
reflected a change in the common law concerning out-of-court
statements. Simply put, even if Brasier did change the rules in
England, it is questionable whether that was generally
understood in 1791 in England, much less the states.
Finally, the law shortly after ratification, as the Court
reviewed in Crawford, would bear little on the Framers’
understanding. Post-framing law and commentary dealt
principally with the 1803 report of Brasier in East or the 1815
report reprinted in the English Reports, which injected the case
into the law of hearsay.163
All of this is not to say that history is irrelevant to an
understanding of confrontation or other rights, or to suggest that
every historical inquiry will be as complex as Brasier.164 Nor is
163

See supra Part I.D.2.
That said, a recent dialogue between Professor Davies, who criticized
the history relied on by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Crawford, and
Robert Kry, Justice Scalia’s law clerk during the Crawford term, reflects
practical complexities similar to those illustrated by Brasier. In a recent
article, Professor Davies makes a persuasive historical argument that the
Supreme Court’s history in Crawford was inaccurate. Davies, Not the
Framers’ Design, supra note 26. Mr. Kry’s rebuttal relies on impressive
research into framing-era law and practices. Kry, supra note 26. Reading
both pieces, I imagined how a busy prosecutor or defense lawyer could be
expected to properly research similar historic issues, or how a law clerk or
judge would get to the bottom of the competing arguments in the pieces
(considering caseload demands). Mr. Kry’s rebuttal, for instance, included
analyses of multiple editions of several cases (several of limited general
availability) that changed over time (like Brasier). He also scoured the Old
Bailey Session Papers, obtained committal depositions from the London
Metropolitan Archives, and engaged in an analysis of how Sir Francis Buller
(the trial judge in Brasier) incorrectly reported certain cases. See Kry, supra
note 26, at 18-19, 28.
164
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the fact that a legal framework is difficult to apply necessarily a
sound basis to abandon it.
The question remains, however, whether the real-world
limitations of requiring proof of “original meaning,” as the
exclusive analytical mode will encourage unwarranted
assumptions about cases or lead to the creation of shorthand tests
based on inauthentic history, such as the recent state high court
case that simply presumed that Brasier meant that statements to
non-law enforcement personnel could be testimonial in nature.165
Eighteenth century authorities such as Brasier change over time,
as courts and scholars rely on different versions of the case or
misinterpretations of the case found in treatises. Given the
nature of the sources, it may be possible for advocates to
construct a compelling case of “original meaning” for either side
of an issue in cases where the common law is not clear. The
framework, therefore, may well lead to the very “unpredictable”
and “amorphous” framework166 Crawford sought to replace.
CONCLUSION
There may never be a consensus on what Brasier really
meant at the time of the framing, which is something originalists
can probably live with.167 A more basic question is whether a
legal framework that requires lawyers and judges to essentially
become historians could in fact be no better than the
“reliability” approach overruled by Crawford. To be sure, the
reliability framework was far from perfect. Yet, the current
rigid history-based doctrine, which requires the time to locate
and digest complex, unfamiliar historic materials that are filled
with traps for the unwary, appears no better suited to limit
short-hand legal tests, selective interpretation by advocates, and
results-oriented decision-making. The current framework,
moreover, may provide a means to legitimize such practices by
shrouding them in “history,” authentic or not.
165
166
167

See supra text accompanying note 40.
See supra note 5.
See discussion supra note 27.

